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BIRTH CONFLICTS: LEVERAGING STATE POWER TO
COERCE HEALTH CARE DECISION-MAKING
Elizabeth Kukura*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Pregnancy is a time filled with decision-making for the pregnant
woman and her partner—ranging from major decisions about who
will care for the infant and whether changes in housing or
employment will be necessary to less consequential decisions about
stroller choice, diapering method, and nursery design. Countless
books and articles provide prospective parents with advice about their
choices in baby names, feeding methods, and parenting philosophy.1
For many women, however, the decisions they face about their
medical care throughout pregnancy and childbirth are more difficult
to navigate. Most women do not have the medical knowledge
necessary to anticipate and understand complications as they arise, at
least without independent research. Doctors help guide women
through unfamiliar terrain, explaining childbirth and the risks and
benefits of different approaches to managing it, but patients often
lack critical information about factors that may influence a
physician’s clinical recommendation—including professional
philosophy, prior experience with malpractice claims, potential
financial incentives, or hospital protocols and policies that impact
physician behavior.2 Recognizing the complexities of pregnancy

*

1.

2.

Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Drexel University, Thomas R. Kline School of
Law. LLM, Temple Law School; J.D., NYU School of Law; MSc, London School of
Economics; B.A., Yale University. Many thanks to participants at the University of
Baltimore Center on Applied Feminism’s Tenth Feminist Legal Theory Conference
(March 2017) and at the Law and Society Association Annual Meeting (Mexico City
2017), especially Aziza Ahmed, for their comments and suggestions. Thanks also to
Jacey Smith, Megan Micco, and the staff of the University of Baltimore Law Review
for their dedicated editorial work and interest in the topic.
See, e.g., Jennifer Senior, For Parents, Happiness Is a Very High Bar, TEDTALKS
(Mar. 2014), https://www.ted.com/talks/jennifer_senior_for_parents_happiness_is_a_
very_high_bar (discussing the vast array of parenting books on bookstore shelves).
See, e.g., Tina Rosenberg, Reducing Unnecessary C-Section Births, N.Y. TIMES:
OPINIONATOR (Jan. 19, 2016, 3:21 AM), https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2016/0
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decision-making, some advocacy groups have organized to provide
consumer education about women’s rights during childbirth and the
possible undisclosed risks and benefits of different courses of
treatment.3 Two states have even taken legislative action to mandate
hospital disclosure of certain maternal health outcomes in order to
empower better decision-making among pregnant women as they
choose where and how to give birth.4 Nevertheless, for some women,
maternity care decision-making continues to be fraught with doubt,
fear, and sometimes, conflict.

3.

4.

1/19/arsdarian-cutting-the-number-of-c-section-births/ (analyzing why choice of
hospital influences likelihood of cesarean more than clinical indicators like fetal heart
rate or labor progress).
See, e.g., CHOICES IN CHILDBIRTH, SER. NO. 4, NATIONAL GUIDE TO A HEALTHY BIRTH
4 (Milon Nagi ed., 2012), http://choicesinchildbirth.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/
CIC_2013NationalGuide_WEB.pdf; What to Ask . . . a Physician Who May Provide
Your Maternity Care, CHILDBIRTH CONNECTION, http://www.nationalpartnership.org/r
esearch-library/maternal-health/what-to-ask-physician.pdf (last visited Dec. 30, 2017).
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111, § 70E (West 2018) (“Every maternity patient, at the
time of pre-admission, shall receive complete information from an admitting hospital
on its annual rate of primary caesarian sections, annual rate of repeat caesarian
sections, annual rate of total caesarian sections, annual percentage of women who
have had a caesarian section who have had a subsequent successful vaginal birth,
annual percentage of deliveries in birthing rooms and labor-delivery-recovery or
labor-delivery-recovery-postpartum rooms, annual percentage of deliveries by
certified nurse-midwives, annual percentage which were continuously externally
monitored only, annual percentage which were continuously internally monitored
only, annual percentage which were monitored both internally and externally, annual
percentages utilizing intravenous, inductions, augmentation, forceps, episiotomies,
spinals, epidurals and general anesthesia, and its annual percentage of women breastfeeding upon discharge from said hospital.”); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2803-j(2)(a)–
(m) (McKinney 2018) (“[A hospital’s informational] . . . leaflet shall also include
statistics relating to the annual percentage of maternity related procedures performed
at such hospital or birth center, as provided by the commissioner, including but not
limited to the following: (a) the annual rate of cesarean sections, primary, repeat and
total, performed at such facility; (b) the annual percentage of women with previous
cesarean sections who have had a subsequent successful vaginal birth; (c) the annual
percentage of deliveries by midwives; (d) the annual percentage of births utilizing
electronic fetal monitoring listed on the basis of external and internal; (e) the annual
percentage of births utilizing forceps, listed on the basis of low forceps delivery and
mid forceps delivery; (f) the annual percentage of breech births delivered vaginally;
(g) the annual percentage of births utilizing analgesia; (h) the annual percentage of
births utilizing anesthesia including general, spinal, epidural, and paracervical listed
on the basis of vaginal and cesarean births; (i) the annual percentage of births utilizing
induction of labor; (j) the annual percentage of births utilizing augmentation of labor;
(k) the annual percentage of vaginal births utilizing episiotomies; (l) whether birthing
rooms are available for use in the facility; [and] (m) whether rooming-in is available
in the facility, on the basis of twenty-four hours a day or daytime.”).
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One version of this occurs when a provider and patient disagree
about the appropriate course of treatment during labor and delivery,
with the patient declining to follow her care provider’s
recommendation.5 Although such conflict is most commonly
associated with cesarean surgery, there are various other decision
points during childbirth when a provider and patient may disagree
regarding a clinical recommendation. These include the decision to
induce labor artificially using drugs,6 the prophylactic administration
of antibiotics after a positive Group B Strep (GBS) test,7 the use of
continuous electronic fetal monitoring to measure fetal heart tones,
which limits the woman’s mobility during labor,8 and the use of a
surgical incision to widen the birth canal—called an episiotomy.9
The reasons for a woman’s resistance to her provider’s preferred
approach vary but may include religious objections, fear, negative
experiences during a previous birth, preference for unmedicated
delivery, or concern about the risks associated with the recommended
course of treatment.10 In some cases, additional counseling and better
communication between the provider and patient can help overcome
the disagreement, leading either to a woman’s consent to treatment or
the identification of an alternative approach.11
When the
disagreement persists, however, women may find themselves in a
5.

6.

7.
8.
9.
10.

11.

Although most conflicts arise between a patient and a physician, other health care
providers, such as nurses and midwives, may urge interventions or other types of
clinical care that patients decline and which become the basis of conflict in the
maternity care setting. In hospital-based maternity care, physicians usually occupy
supervisory roles over nurses and midwives, and thus presumably have the ultimate
authority in such circumstances, but this article will use the general term “provider” in
order to include situations where patients experience coercion by non-physician
maternity care providers. See infra Part II. However, because physicians play a
dominant role in hospital-based maternity care, the legal analysis of providers’ legal
and ethical obligations in Part III will focus on physicians. See infra Part III.
See HENCI GOER & AMY ROMANO, OPTIMAL CARE IN CHILDBIRTH: THE CASE FOR A
PHYSIOLOGIC APPROACH 129–43 (2012) (discussing research that challenges the
validity of assumptions underlying liberal use of elective induction of labor).
See id. at 144–45 (comparing risks of GBS infection with risks of prophylactic
administration of antibiotics during labor).
See id. at 223–39 (discussing limitations of continuous electronic fetal monitoring as a
tool to promote fetal well-being and its association with unnecessary surgeries).
See id. at 353–63 (discussing research on the risks of prophylactic use of episiotomy).
See Joel Jay Finer, Toward Guidelines for Compelling Cesarean Surgery: Of Rights,
Responsibility, and Decisional Authenticity, 76 MINN. L. REV. 239, 285–90 (1991)
(discussing reasons why a woman may disagree with her health care provider’s
approach, including voluntariness, authenticity, informed refusal, and religious
objection).
See infra note 218 and accompanying text.
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standoff with their providers, leading to heightened conflict. Of
particular concern are situations where providers threaten to use state
power to compel a woman to consent to the recommended course of
treatment—either by seeking a court order or by reporting the patient
to the state child welfare authorities for neglect or abuse of the baby
she will soon deliver.12
Although various legal scholars have examined the use of court
orders to compel pregnant women to undergo medical treatment,
examining constitutional questions related to religious liberty and
reproductive freedom, the position of health care providers in such
situations has garnered much less attention.13 This paper contributes
to the existing scholarship by considering how the specter of state
involvement acts coercively to impact maternity care decisionmaking. It examines the legal and ethical implications for health care
providers as they navigate birth conflicts and make decisions about
what kind of counseling they provide to their patients, how they
approach the informed consent process, and how they exercise their
judgment as medical experts. The paper uses the example of health
care providers relying on health-based justifications to threaten or
secure involvement of child welfare authorities in order to examine
how coercing consent through threats of state involvement violates
physicians’ legal and ethical responsibilities and may also have
broader negative public health implications.14 In doing so, the paper
challenges the pregnancy exceptionalism that tolerates coercion in the
provider-patient relationship and identifies types of changes required
to ensure meaningful protection of a woman’s right to control her
medical treatment when giving birth.15
12.
13.

14.
15.

See infra Section II.A.
See, e.g., Finer, supra note 10, at 270–74; Janet Gallagher, Prenatal Invasions &
Interventions: What’s Wrong with Fetal Rights, 10 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 9, 14–31
(1987); Lisa C. Ikemoto, The Code of Perfect Pregnancy: At the Intersection of the
Ideology of Motherhood, the Practice of Defaulting to Science, and the Interventionist
Mindset of Law, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1205, 1240–46 (1992); Eric M. Levine, Comment,
The Constitutionality of Court-Ordered Cesarean Surgery: A Threshold Question, 4
ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 229, 272–90 (1994). Others have analyzed how pregnancy
seems to create exceptions to established legal norms governing consent and the right
to refuse unwanted medical treatment. See, e.g., Nancy K. Rhoden, The Judge in the
Delivery Room: The Emergence of Court-Ordered Cesareans, 74 CALIF. L. REV.
1951, 1968–89 (1986).
See infra Sections II.A, II.B.2.
See infra Part IV. This Article refers to women as the actors against whom legal
threats are made during childbirth, but the author acknowledges that some men also
experience pregnancy and childbirth. See Robin Marantz Henig, Transgender Men
Who Become Pregnant Face Social, Health Challenges, NPR (Nov. 7, 2014, 3:53
PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2014/11/07/362269036/transgender-
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Part II begins by exploring how coercion operates in maternity care
decision-making, particularly in the form of child welfare threats, and
highlights the ways in which bias influences and exacerbates
coercion in health care settings. It then considers the potential
consequences of such coercion during childbirth, including physical,
emotional, and financial impacts, as well as possible implications for
the medical system and public health more generally. Part II ends by
describing the limited body of existing data on coercion during
childbirth and identifying significant gaps in knowledge about
women’s childbearing experiences. Part III analyzes the legal and
ethical norms that constrain provider behavior and should serve to
prevent coercion from influencing women’s reproductive decisionmaking. Finally, Part IV sets forth a multi-pronged approach to
changing the conditions that allow coercion to creep into providerpatient relationships.
II. MAKING LEGAL THREATS DURING BIRTH
When a pregnant patient declines to follow medical advice, her
health care provider may resort to coercive tactics to secure the
woman’s consent to treatment.16 Such tactics may include seeking
judicial intervention to compel the recommended treatment,17
enforcing institution-wide policies that restrict access to particular
types of health care,18 applying pressure by withholding treatment or
using emotional scare tactics,19 or threatening involvement by child
welfare authorities.20 Cases involving maternity care provider
coercion rarely make it to court, and even more rarely are they

16.

17.
18.

19.
20.

men-who-become-pregnant-face-health-challenges. More research is needed on
various aspects of coercion in maternity care, including the experiences of transgender
individuals seeking maternity care in mainstream health care institutions.
See Michelle Oberman, Mothers and Doctors’ Orders: Unmasking the Doctor’s
Fiduciary Role in Maternal-Fetal Conflicts, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 451, 469 (2000) (“It is
only in the context of pregnancy that doctors assert the right to compel their patients
to heed medical advice.”).
Elizabeth Kukura, Obstetric Violence, 106 GEORGETOWN L.J. (forthcoming Mar.
2018) (manuscript at 14–15).
See Elizabeth Kukura, Choice in Birth: Preserving Access to VBAC, 114 PENN ST. L.
REV. 955, 957, 971–73 (2010) (explaining the emergence of restrictions on vaginal
birth after cesarean (VBAC) and their implications for pregnant women); see also
Kukura, supra note 17 (manuscript at 18) (discussing restrictions on VBAC as a form
of coercion in maternity care).
Kukura, supra note 17 (manuscript at 23–25).
See id. (manuscript at 20–22) (discussing coercion during childbirth as a form of
obstetric violence).
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reflected in written case law.21 Of those existing reported cases, most
involve situations where a hospital and its physician initiate legal
proceedings seeking permission to perform a cesarean over the
woman’s objection. After the birth, the woman appeals the court
order or challenges it in federal court, resulting in a written opinion.
The highest appellate court that has heard a challenge to a courtordered cesarean vacated the order and held that the woman had the
right to make treatment decisions for herself and her fetus, including
refusing the cesarean.22 Nevertheless, the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals left open the possibility that in “extremely rare and truly
exceptional” cases, “a conflicting state interest may be so compelling
that the patient’s wishes must yield.”23
Some courts have
subsequently enforced a pregnant woman’s right to refuse
treatment,24 but others have rejected the In re A.C. court’s reasoning
and granted orders compelling cesareans.25 In 1996, in what has
become a notable case, Laura Pemberton left the hospital in active
labor after she learned that administrators planned to seek a court

21.
22.

23.
24.

25.

See Theresa Morris & Joan H. Robinson, Forced and Coerced Cesarean Sections in
the United States, 16 CONTEXTS 24, 25 (2017).
In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1237–38 (D.C. 1990) (en banc) (discussing how
physicians obtained a court order to perform a cesarean against a cancer-stricken
patient’s wishes but the fetus was stillborn and the woman died two days later).
Id. at 1252.
See, e.g., Burton v. State, 49 So. 3d 263, 265–66 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (vacating
order for forced bed rest on the basis of the woman’s “fundamental constitutional
right to refuse medical intervention”); In re Brown, 689 N.E.2d 397, 405 (Ill. App. Ct.
1997) (holding that “the State may not override a pregnant woman’s competent
treatment decision” in order to save the life of a viable fetus); In re Baby Boy Doe,
632 N.E.2d 326, 332 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (“[A] woman’s right to refuse invasive
medical treatment . . . is not diminished during pregnancy.”). No appellate court has
upheld a court order compelling a cesarean since 1981. Farah Diaz-Tello, When the
Invisible Hand Wields a Scalpel: Maternity Care in the Market Economy, 18 CUNY
L. REV. 197, 213 (2015).
Lisa Collier Cool, Could You Be Forced to Have a C-Section?, BABY TALK (May
2005), http://advocatesforpregnantwomen.org/articles/forced_c-section.htm; What Are
Mothers’ Rights During Childbirth?, NBC NEWS (May 19, 2004),
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/5012918/ (discussing a Pennsylvania court order granting
Wilkes-Barre General Hospital guardianship of Amber Marlowe’s fetus in order to
perform a cesarean against Marlowe’s will). Doctors had informed Marlowe—who
had previously delivered six children vaginally, all nearly 12 pounds each—that her
baby was large and would require a cesarean delivery, which she did not believe was
necessary. What Are Mothers’ Rights During Childbirth?, supra. After the hospital
obtained a court order, she went to another area hospital and vaginally delivered a
healthy eleven-pound baby. Id.
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order compelling a cesarean.26 The sheriff and state’s attorney
subsequently removed her from her home for a judicial hearing at the
hospital, during which the judge ordered a cesarean be performed,
even though the woman reported she could feel the fetus progressing
into the birth canal without complication.27 A federal district court
later rejected Pemberton’s claims of negligence, false imprisonment,
and violation of her constitutional rights.28
The prospect of medical authorities using judicial power to force
women to submit to major abdominal surgery against their will has,
appropriately, drawn the attention of legal scholars.29 Given the
tendency of courts to locate the authority to compel a cesarean in the
Supreme Court’s recognition in Roe v. Wade30 of a compelling state
interest in protecting potential life, the pregnancy treatment cases
have inspired analysis of a woman’s liberty and privacy rights in
childbirth and critique of the comparison between compelled
treatment in pregnancy and abortion rights.31 Other situations where
health care providers threaten to involve the state in order to secure a
woman’s consent have received much less attention, despite the
potential for harm to women, babies, and families, and the serious
constitutional and public health concerns such threats raise. In
particular, threatening to report a woman to child welfare authorities

26.
27.

28.
29.
30.
31.

Pemberton v. Tallahassee Mem’l Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1249–50
(N.D. Fla. 1999).
Id.; Video Recording: Laura Pemberton’s Talk at the 2007 National Summit to Ensure
the Health and Humanity of Pregnant and Birthing Women (National Advocates for
Pregnant
Women
2007)
[hereinafter
Pemberton
Video
Recording],
https://vimeo.com/4895023. Laura Pemberton had previously had a cesarean
performed using a vertical incision, which increased the risk of uterine rupture
associated with subsequent vaginal deliveries. Pemberton, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 1249.
She had decided to deliver at home after being unable to find a physician who would
support her decision to attempt a vaginal delivery, which she reasoned was safer than
an elective repeat cesarean given her desire to have more children in the future. See
Pemberton Video Recording, supra. Pemberton later moved to another state and
subsequently delivered four more children vaginally, including twins. Id.
Pemberton, 66 F. Supp. 2d at 1257.
See supra note 13.
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
See, e.g., April L. Cherry, Roe’s Legacy: The Nonconsensual Medical Treatment of
Pregnant Women and Implications for Female Citizenship, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 723,
723–39 (2004); Oberman, supra note 16, at 475–76; Lynn M. Paltrow & Jeanne
Flavin, Pregnant, and No Civil Rights, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2014), https://www.nytim
es.com/2014/11/08/opinion/pregnant-and-no-civil-rights.html?_r=0; see also Kukura,
supra note 17 (manuscript at 63–66) (providing recommendations for advocacy to
protect women’s rights in childbirth).
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if she fails to consent to treatment represents an important, underexplored form of coercion in clinical settings.
This Part examines how child welfare threats constitute coercion in
maternity care. In Section A, the paper sets forth several examples
that illustrate how such threats arise, followed in Section B by an
analysis of the potential implications of child welfare threats both for
individual women and for the broader public health. Finally, Section
C argues that, despite the current lack of data on this phenomenon,
there is sufficient reason for concern about child welfare threats and
the harms they pose.
A. Coercing Consent with Child Welfare Threats
Federal law requires that all states maintain procedures to
investigate suspected cases of child maltreatment.32 Beginning in the
1970s, states established Child Protective Services (CPS) agencies to
fulfill this mandate, with partial funding from the federal
government.33 State and federal law define child abuse and neglect,
as well as set forth guidelines regarding the reporting of suspected
abuse and neglect to the proper authorities.34 Generally, an
individual is required to report suspected maltreatment when he or
she “knows or has reasonable cause to believe or suspect that a child
has been subjected to abuse or neglect.”35 Health care providers and
other professionals are subject to heightened standards regarding

32.

33.

34.

35.

See Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4 (1974)
(requiring states to implement systems for reporting, investigation, and treatment of
child abuse and neglect).
John E. B. Myers, A Short History of Child Protection in America, 42 FAM. L.Q. 449,
454, 456–57 (2008). States use different names and acronyms to refer to their CPS
agencies, including Department of Children and Families (DCF), Department of
Children and Family Services (DCFS), or the Department of Social Services (DSS).
See Related Organizations: State Child Welfare Agency Directors, CHILD WELFARE
INFO. GATEWAY, https://www.childwelfare.gov/organizations/?CWIGFunctionsaction
=rols:main.dspList&rolType=Custom&RS_ID=158 (last visited Dec. 30, 2017).
See CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, DEFINITIONS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 4
(2016), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/define.pdf (discussing standards for
reporting child abuse and neglect). Federal law defines child abuse and neglect as
“any recent act or failure to act on the part of a parent or caretaker, which results in
death, serious physical or emotional harm, sexual abuse or exploitation, or an act or
failure to act which presents an imminent risk of serious harm.” CAPTA
Reauthorization Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-320, sec. 142(a), § 3(2), 124 Stat. 3459,
3482 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5101 (2012)).
CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, supra note 34, at 4.
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mandatory reporting of potential maltreatment that they encounter in
their work with children and families.36
A recent Florida case illustrates certain concerns and dynamics that
are often present in situations of coerced decision-making in
childbirth.37 In 2014, doctors for Jennifer Goodall threatened
possible intervention by child welfare authorities in their attempt to
convince Goodall, a mother of three who was nearly thirty-nine
weeks pregnant, to consent to an elective cesarean surgery for her
impending birth.38 After three previous cesarean surgeries, Goodall
had considered the risks of both a vaginal birth after cesarean
(VBAC) and repeat cesarean; she decided to pursue a vaginal
delivery in order to avoid the potential complications of another
surgery and minimize her recovery time.39
After several
conversations with her health care providers in which Goodall
indicated her familiarity with the risks and benefits of each delivery
method, she understood her doctors to be willing to attend her
VBAC.40

36.
37.
38.
39.

40.

CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, MANDATORY REPORTERS OF CHILD ABUSE AND
NEGLECT 2 (2016), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/manda.pdf.
See Goodall v. Comprehensive Women’s Health Ctr., No. 2:14-cv-399-FtM-38CM,
2014 WL 3587290, at *1–2 (M.D. Fla. July 18, 2014).
Id.
See id. Research suggests that a fourth cesarean surgery “carries a 1 in 8 chance of
major complications.” Press Release, Nat’l Advocates for Pregnant Women, Florida
Hospital Says It Will Force Pregnant Woman to Have Cesarean Surgery (July 25,
2014), http://advocatesforpregnantwomen.org/blog/2014/07/press_release_florida_hos
pital.php [hereinafter Goodall Press Release]. The American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists says that 60–80% of women who attempt VBAC are successful.
Id. Uterine rupture occurs in approximately 0.7% to 0.9% of VBAC attempts. Am.
Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, Practice Bulletin No. 115: Vaginal Birth After
Previous Cesarean Delivery, 116 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 450, 451 tbl.1 (2010)
[hereinafter ACOG Practice Bulletin]. The risk of infant death resulting from uterine
rupture is even smaller—approximately one in 2,000. Mona Lydon-Rochelle et al.,
Risk of Uterine Rupture During Labor Among Women with a Prior Cesarean
Delivery, 345 NEW ENG. J. MED. 3, 7 tbl.4 (2001). For more information about
research on the safety of VBAC and the resulting impact on hospital policies
restricting or encouraging VBAC for low-risk women, see Elizabeth Kukura,
Contested Care: The Limitations of Evidence-Based Maternity Care Reform, 31
BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 241, 260–61, 267–70 (2016).
See Declaration of Jennifer Goodall at 2–4, Goodall, No. 2:14-cv-399-FtM-36CM
(M.D. Fla. July 18, 2014). Throughout her prenatal care and the later legal
proceedings, Goodall expressed her “absolute[] . . . consent to such surgery if there is
a complication that arises during . . . labor that requires this surgical intervention.” Id.
at 3.
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However, towards the end of her pregnancy, Goodall’s case was
referred to the hospital ethics committee.41 When she was one day
short of thirty-nine weeks pregnant, she received a letter handdelivered to her home from the Chief Financial Officer of Bayfront
Health Port Charlotte (BHPC).42 The letter indicated that Goodall’s
maternity care providers intended to report her to the Department of
Children and Family Services and petition for a court order to
perform a cesarean.43 In addition, the letter stated that if Goodall
presented at the hospital in labor, “a Cesarean section . . . [would] be
performed with or without . . . [her] consent.”44 The hospital also
recommended that she seek care from another physician who would
support her decision to deliver vaginally,45 even though BHPC was
the only hospital in the area that serves patients who want to pursue
VBAC.46
Goodall promptly sought a temporary restraining order (TRO) in
federal court to prevent the hospital from following through on its
threats.47 In addition to claims based on her constitutional rights to
privacy, bodily autonomy, medical decision-making, life, and due
process—all stemming from her cesarean refusal48—Goodall also
argued that her right to privacy “encompasse[d] her right to family
relationships and parental decision making undisturbed by the state,”
citing authority about “[t]he liberty interest . . . of parents in the care,
custody, and control of their children . . . .”49 She argued that “state
41.
42.

43.
44.

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Goodall, 2014 WL 3587290, at *1.
Letter from Cheryl Tibbett, CFO, Bayfront Health Med. Grp., to Jennifer Goodall
(July 10, 2014) [hereinafter Bayfront Letter] (attached as Exhibit 1 to Declaration of
Jennifer Goodall, supra note 40); Complaint for Temp. Restraining Order,
Preliminary Injunction, Declaratory Judgment, & Damages at 5, Goodall, No. 2:14cv-399-FtM-38CM (M.D. Fla. July 18, 2014) [hereinafter Goodall Complaint].
Bayfront Letter, supra note 42, at 1–2.
Id. at 2. This statement begs the question of why it intended to “begin a process for an
Expedited Judicial Intervention Concerning Medical Treatment Procedures,” if the
hospital intended to perform a cesarean with or without Goodall’s consent should she
seek further care there. Id.
Id.
Goodall Complaint, supra note 42, at 5.
See id. at 14.
Id. at 7–9.
Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Support of the Motion for Temp. Restraining
Order & Complaint for Preliminary Injunction, Declaratory Judgment, & Damages at
13–14, Goodall v. Comprehensive Women’s Health Ctr., No. 2:14-cv-399-FtM-38CM
(M.D. Fla. July 18, 2014) [hereinafter Goodall Brief] (quoting Troxel v. Granville,
530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000)) (“The liberty interest . . . of parents in the care, custody, and
control of their children . . . is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests
recognized by this Court.”); see also, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753
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action must withstand strict scrutiny when it threatens to come
between parents and their children.”50 Intrusions upon family privacy
in the interests of child welfare are limited to those circumstances
recognized by state statute, which does not contemplate child welfare
jurisdiction over the medical decisions of competent adults acting on
their own behalf.51 Nor does mandatory reporting by health
professionals extend to conflicts over medical treatment during
childbirth.52 In addition to alleging various constitutional violations,
Goodall also brought claims of intentional and negligent infliction of
emotional distress on the basis “that she, a nearly full-term pregnant
woman soon to deliver,” “experienced great fear and worry” upon
receiving the hospital’s threats of forced surgery and child welfare
involvement in her family’s life.53
The federal court declined to issue a TRO, finding that Goodall had
no “right to compel a physician or medical facility to perform a
medical procedure in the manner she wishe[d] against their best
This statement reflects a deep
medical judgment.”54
misunderstanding about the difference between a VBAC and a
cesarean, seeming to equate the physiological process of labor
resulting in vaginal delivery with a major abdominal surgery.55 This

50.
51.
52.

53.
54.
55.

(1982) (noting a “historical recognition that freedom of personal choice in matters of
family life is a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment”);
Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (“Our decisions establish
that the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the
institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (recognizing the right “to marry,
establish a home and bring up children”); Moriarty v. Bradt, 827 A.2d 203, 213 (N.J.
2003) (“The right to rear one’s children . . . has been identified as a fundamental liberty
interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . .”).
Goodall Brief, supra note 49, at 14.
Id. (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 39.001–39.8298 (West 2018)).
See generally FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 39.01, 39.201 (West 2018) (laying out requirements
for mandatory reporting of child abuse, neglect, or abandonment without any mention
of reporting pregnant women who disagree with their physicians’ recommendations).
See also Goodall Brief, supra note 49, at 14 (noting absence of “indication that the
Legislature has granted the DCFS jurisdiction over fetuses in addition to children”).
Goodall also suggested that reporting her to DCFS “may even trigger an abrogation of
reporter immunity,” resulting in civil and criminal liability. Id. (citing FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 39.205(9) (West 2018)) (“A person who knowingly and willfully makes a
false report of child abuse, abandonment, or neglect . . . is guilty of a felony of the
third degree . . . .”).
Goodall Complaint, supra note 42, at 2, 11.
Goodall, 2014 WL 3587290, at *3.
See Goodall Press Release, supra note 39 (“The process of labor and delivery isn’t a
procedure; our client is the one trying to avoid a compelled medical procedure.”).
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inaccurate comparison misrepresents the degree of intervention
required in each birth, as well as the resulting hardship (or lack
thereof) on the parties involved.56 In doing so, the court suggests that
a vaginal delivery saddles a physician with serious burden—one left
unidentified and unquantified—elevating that supposed burden above
the very real burden a woman suffers after undergoing an unwanted
cesarean.57 The court did not address Goodall’s arguments that the
hospital’s threat to report her to the child welfare authorities was a
wrongful attempt to “coerce Ms. Goodall into acquiescence” or
constituted “a form of patient abandonment.”58
Child welfare threats can be a powerful tool to secure a patient’s
acquiescence to a course of treatment preferred by providers. In
2010, Michelle Mitchell went into labor and proceeded to Augusta
Health in Augusta County, Virginia.59 During her final weeks of
pregnancy, her doctors had urged her to plan an induction or cesarean
because they suspected she was carrying a large baby.60 But Mitchell
56.

57.

58.

59.
60.

See Diaz-Tello, supra note 24, at 199. The misleading comparison between the
burdens of vaginal and cesarean delivery reflects the high degree of medicalization of
childbirth in modern maternity care, such that few hospital-based vaginal deliveries
are free from medical intervention—even though many routine interventions offered
to laboring women are not evidence-based. See id. (“[C]hildbirth has been
medicalized to the point where vaginal delivery, the physiological process by which a
fetus is expelled from the body, is now treated as a ‘procedure’ that facilities may
decide to offer . . . or not. Medicalization transforms a fundamental right—the right
to forego an invasive surgery—into a request that a medical facility can grant or
deny.”); see also Kukura, supra note 39, at 250–53, 256–60 (discussing the trend
towards medicalization of childbirth in the United States).
Hospitals and doctors who maintain VBAC-restrictive policies generally justify them
by citing fear of medical malpractice liability and the increased cost of practicing
obstetrics due to high malpractice awards for birth complications. See Goodall Brief,
supra note 49, at 23–24. Even if liability exposure were a valid basis on which to
force patients to accept unwanted medical treatment, Goodall argued that “her
willingness to consent to surgery if she is advised that any condition indicating need
for surgery arises during labor, as well as to memorialize in writing her understanding
of the potential risks and benefits of . . . [trial of labor after cesarean] and repeat
cesarean surgery . . . . will serve to protect any interest the hospital has with respect to
limiting exposure to medicolegal liability.” Id. at 25.
Id. at 14–51; see also Goodall, 2014 WL 3587290, at *3 (explaining why Goodall
failed to meet the requirements for a temporary restraining order but failing to address
her coercion argument).
Farah Diaz-Tello, Invisible Wounds: Obstetric Violence in the United States, 24
REPROD. HEALTH MATTERS, 56, 58 (2016).
Id.; see also Devin Turk, UPDATE: Verdict Reached in Mother’s Lawsuit that
Claimed C-Section Was Coerced, WHSV (Nov. 7, 2015, 10:01 AM),
http://www.whsv.com/content/news/Mothers-Lawsuit-Says-C-Section-Was-Coerced341274302.html (describing Mitchell’s lawsuit). Research does not support suspected
fetal macrosomia—referring to a newborn who is significantly larger than average—
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wanted to have an unmedicated vaginal delivery, having educated
herself about childbirth and hired a doula for support.61 When the
on-call physician at Augusta Health recommended that she proceed
with a cesarean based on her medical records, Mitchell signed a form
acknowledging that she declined to follow this medical
recommendation and waiving liability.62
Nevertheless, “the
physician became more and more insistent, shouting and swearing at
Mitchell and her doula” about her decision to decline a cesarean in
favor of vaginal delivery.63 He ultimately threatened to seek a court
order compelling a cesarean and to call the child welfare authorities
to remove her baby after birth.64 Confronted with such threats,
Mitchell rescinded her informed refusal and acquiesced to the
unwanted surgery.65
Despite the fact that Mitchell relented and delivered by cesarean,
the hospital still called the local child welfare agency, “accusing
Mitchell of being unfit to care for her child because of the conflict
that arose from her decision to deliver vaginally.”66 The hospital
prevented Mitchell from being with her newborn immediately after
the birth and refused to release the child to her.67 Three months of
invasive interviews and home observations were necessary before the
child welfare authorities deemed the investigation baseless and
dismissed it.68
No court has ruled on the question of whether a cesarean refusal
can constitute a valid basis for a finding of child neglect or abuse.
The closest a court has come to doing so arose out of a case before
the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.69 In 2006, a
pregnant woman, V.M., went to Saint Barnabas Hospital in New

61.
62.
63.
64.

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

as a valid indication for induction. CAROL SAKALA & MAUREEN P. CORRY, EVIDENCEBASED MATERNITY CARE: WHAT IT IS AND WHAT IT CAN ACHIEVE 38 (2008),
https://cdn2.sph.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/32/2017/03/Sakala-Corry_Milb
ank_Evidence-based-MaternityCare.pdf.
Diaz-Tello, supra note 59, at 59.
Id. at 59.
Id.
Update: Augusta Co. Jury Rules in Favor of Doctor in C-Section Case, NBC29 (Nov.
20, 2015, 12:14 PM), http://www.nbc29.com/story/30455784/update-augusta-co-juryrules-in-favor-of-doctor-in-c-section-case.
Diaz-Tello, supra note 59, at 59.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. V.M., 974 A.2d 448, 449 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2009) (per curiam).
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Jersey in labor and was presented with a variety of consent forms to
sign upon her admission.70 She “consented to the administration of
intravenous fluids, antibiotics, oxygen, fetal heart rate monitoring, an
episiotomy and an epidural anesthetic,” but she declined to consent at
the outset to other invasive treatment, including a cesarean or fetal
scalp stimulation.71 Her health care providers urged her to sign the
cesarean consent form “in the event of an emergency,” despite the
fact that there was no medical need for a cesarean, and the fact that
declining to consent upon admission would not preclude her from
choosing a cesarean should the medical circumstances later change.72
She experienced continued pressure from her health care providers,
who also questioned her competence to refuse treatment and referred
her to the hospital psychiatrist, who concluded that she was
competent to determine her own course of treatment.73 V.M.
eventually delivered a healthy baby vaginally without
complications.74 Nevertheless, the hospital reported her to the
Division of Youth and Family Services (DYFS) based on her refusal
to provide advance consent to a cesarean.75 DYFS removed the
newborn from V.M.’s care and placed the infant in foster care—later
securing termination of her parental rights, a decision that was upheld
on appeal.76
Although the appellate court ultimately affirmed the Family
Court’s decision to terminate V.M.’s parental rights, the panel that
heard her case disagreed about whether it was appropriate to consider
a cesarean refusal as evidence of parental neglect.77 The per curiam
opinion recognized that the Family Court judge based his finding of
70.
71.
72.

73.

74.
75.
76.
77.

Id. at 449–50 (Carchman, P.J.A.D., concurring).
Id. at 450 (footnote omitted).
Brief of Amici Curiae Experts in Maternal & Neonatal Health, Birth, & Child Welfare
at 4, V.M., 974 A.2d 448 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009) (No. FN-07-572-06); see
also V.M., 974 A.2d at 449 (Carchman, P.J.A.D., concurring) (“Despite the medical
opinion that the fetus demonstrated signs of distress and that the procedure was
necessary to avoid imminent danger to the fetus, the child was born by vaginal
delivery without incident.”).
Brief of Amici Curiae Experts in Maternal & Neonatal Health, Birth, & Child
Welfare, supra note 72, at 4–5. The psychiatrist “concluded that V.M. was not
psychotic and had the capacity for informed consent with regard to the c-section.”
V.M., 974 A.2d at 451 (Carchman, P.J.A.D., concurring).
V.M., 974 A.2d at 449 (Carchman, P.J.A.D., concurring).
Id. at 449–50, 452.
Id. at 450.
Compare id. at 448 (per curiam) (declining to decide whether cesarean refusal should
be considered in assessing neglect), with id. at 450 (Carchman, P.J.A.D., concurring)
(determining that consideration of cesarean refusal “is improper and beyond the
legislative scope of the child-protective statutes”).
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neglect in part on V.M.’s cesarean refusal but pointed to other
grounds for an adverse finding based on the investigation conducted
by DYFS after the baby’s birth.78 The concurring opinion cited
hospital records that referred to V.M. as “combative,”
“uncooperative,” “erratic,” “noncompliant,” “irrational,” and
“inappropriate,” which the court may have found compelling in
connection with evidence of her previous diagnosis of mental
illness.79 However, such adjectives could also describe many women
in the midst of childbirth, especially under conditions where a woman
perceives herself as being threatened by her health care providers.
By relying on other grounds to affirm the termination of V.M.’s
parental rights, the court dodged the need to address whether a
cesarean refusal itself is a valid and sufficient basis for a neglect
finding against a mother.80 Although the appellate court technically
avoided answering this question, it is clear that her cesarean refusal
triggered the subsequent investigation by child welfare authorities
that led to the permanent removal of her child from her custody.81
A pregnant woman choosing between a vaginal and cesarean
delivery, or someone considering other possible medical
interventions available to her during childbirth, must balance the risks
and benefits of different courses of treatment. The experience of
V.M. adds an additional factor to this risk-balancing exercise:
possible intervention by child welfare authorities and the loss of
one’s child. This risk is not lost on women, particularly poor women,
women of color, and young women, who are more likely to have
experienced state—and sometimes public—scrutiny of their
reproductive decision-making.82 Doctors or other hospital personnel
78.
79.

80.
81.
82.

Id. at 449 (per curiam).
Id. at 450–51 (Carchman, P.J.A.D., concurring). The possibility that behavioral
health issues could have been a factor in V.M.’s case—both the actual clinical
encounter and the court’s subsequent weighing of the facts in the record—highlight
the complex role that mental illness can play in maternity care coercion. See id. at
451–52, 454–55. A current or prior diagnosis of mental illness may invite heightened
scrutiny of a woman’s decision making, especially a refusal of recommended
treatment, and it may also negatively influence how a patient responds to perceived
pressure from health care providers to pursue a particular course of treatment. In
addition, maternity care coercion may also contribute to poor mental health outcomes
for pregnant and postpartum women. See infra Section II.B.1.b. More attention to the
relationship between behavioral and mental health and birth conflicts is needed on the
part of researchers, advocates, and stakeholders within the health care system.
V.M., 974 A.2d at 449 (per curiam).
Id. at 450–52 (Carchman, P.J.A.D., concurring).
See generally KHIARA M. BRIDGES, THE POVERTY OF PRIVACY RIGHTS (2017)
(examining poor mothers’ interactions with the state and arguing that poor mothers in
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need not actually make a formal report to the child welfare agency in
order to convince a patient to accept recommended treatment; in
many instances, the mere threat is sufficient to accomplish the
provider’s goal of changing a patient’s mind.
Consumer organizations dedicated to improving maternity care in
the United States regularly receive reports from women across the
country who have experienced mistreatment at the hands of their
health care providers while pregnant or giving birth.83 Included in
their stories are accounts of being threatened with child welfare
intervention if they did not consent to treatment. For example, a
Texas woman who declined a labor induction reported that “[the
doctor] said if . . . [she] didn’t go through with the induction today
that he would do everything in his power to make sure CPS would
take . . . [her] children.”84 When she told the physician assistant (PA)
that she preferred to go into labor on her own without the aid of
medication to start contractions, the doctor “was very upset . . . and
[said] that . . . [she] wasn’t to leave until . . . [she] saw him or they’d
have to call CPS.”85 The PA was “incredibly sympathetic” and
agreed to send the woman home to wait for labor to start but warned
the woman that the doctor “would definitely follow up on his
threat.”86 The pregnant woman’s desire to forego induction “seemed
to infuriate” the doctor, resulting in verbal abuse of the woman and

83.

84.

85.
86.

America have been denied the right to privacy); DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE
BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY (1997)
(discussing state intervention in the reproductive autonomy of African American
women).
See Dawn Thompson, Global Momentum Towards Respectful Care, IMPROVING BIRTH
(Sept. 25, 2014), http://improvingbirth.org/2014/09/respectful-care/ (discussing
Improving Birth’s #BreakTheSilence campaign, which was designed to “giv[e]
mothers around the country a forum to voice the abuse and trauma they have
experienced in childbirth”). Improving Birth identifies itself as “the largest U.S.
consumer advocacy organization for better maternity care.” Improving Birth,
Improving Birth/Consumers Welcome Recognition by Medical Community of
Disrespect and Abuse in Childbirth, KINDRED (Aug. 26, 2015), http://kindredmedia.or
g/2015/08/improving-birthconsumers-welcome-recognition-by-medical-community-o
f-disrespect-and-abuse-in-childbirth/.
Brief of Human Rights in Childbirth et al. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiff
Rinat Dray at 27, Dray v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., No. 500510/14 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
filed Dec. 23, 2014) [hereinafter Dray Amicus Brief]. A selection of written
testimonies by women who suffered mistreatment at the hands of their health care
providers was included as an appendix to an amicus brief filed by the organization
Human Rights in Childbirth in a compelled cesarean case litigated in New York. See
id. app. A at A-2.
Id. at 27.
Id.

2018

Birth Conflicts

263

her husband, as the doctor “yell[ed] at the top of his lungs about what
a horribly selfish and dangerous parent . . . [she] was.”87 When she
explained that she could not be induced immediately because she had
to make arrangements for her children, the doctor “told . . . [her] if . .
. [she] didn’t walk over to the hospital right now he’d call the police.
He followed up the threat by picking up his phone.”88
Another woman told Improving Birth how when she asked for
clarification about the need for a cesarean, “[t]he nurse said in a very
strict tone that . . . [she] needed to cooperate, otherwise . . . [she]
could have . . . [her] baby taken away. [The nurse] . . . pointed out
that . . . [she] was a young mother.”89 Rinat Dray, an Orthodox
Jewish mother of two who wanted a vaginal delivery after two prior
cesareans, was told by her doctor “that she would be committing the
equivalent of child abuse and that her baby would be taken away
from her” if she did not consent to the cesarean.90 Child welfare
threats during birth—tacitly supported by the V.M. decision—have a
potential chilling effect that reaches beyond individual cases of
coercion, as women share their birth stories with other women, who
then perceive the potential for state intervention as one more risk to
fear during childbirth. Threats made in one delivery room are likely
to influence other women to either submit to unwanted treatment or
decline to ask relevant, appropriate questions of a care provider out of
fear of similar consequences.91 For example, a New York woman
recounted how the doctors wanted to give her newborn broadspectrum antibiotics because the woman’s Group B Strep status was
unknown; although they did not discuss benefits, risks, or possible
alternatives with her, she “consented because . . . [she] was afraid if .
. . [she] did not, they would call Child Protective Services.”92

87.
88.
89.
90.

91.
92.

Id.
Id. app. A at A-18.
Id. at 27.
Anemona Hartocollis, Mother Accuses Doctors of Forcing a C-Section and Files Suit,
N.Y. TIMES (May 16, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/17/nyregion/motheraccuses-doctors-of-forcing-a-c-section-and-files-suit.html. In her case, the threat did
not have its desired effect of securing her consent to the cesarean, but the hospital
lawyer ultimately advised the physician that a court order was unnecessary and the
physician could simply override her competent consent refusal. See Gorelik Affidavit
at 3, Dray, No. 500510/14 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. filed Nov. 26, 2014).
See Diaz-Tello, supra note 24, at 199 (“The use of the iron fist of the law is rare when
health care providers find that the invisible hand works just as well.”).
Dray Amicus Brief, supra note 84, app. A at A-29.
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CPS reporting triggers an investigation that subjects the entire
family to state surveillance.93 It may open other aspects of the family
members’ private lives to heightened scrutiny—including housing
arrangements, family relationships, education, and nutrition—leading
to the removal of children from their families and termination of
parental rights, even if the circumstances prompting the original
report are ultimately found to be baseless.94 Intervention by child
welfare authorities can have devastating consequences for parents
and children. Once a child has been removed, the legal process to
secure reunification is often long and arduous;95 this poses
particularly serious consequences for mothers and newborns whose
opportunities for early bonding and breastfeeding are interrupted by
the removal.96 But even absent removal, threatening to report a
pregnant woman to the child welfare authorities for disagreeing with
her health care provider’s treatment recommendation can cause harm
by stripping the woman of her decision-making autonomy and
increasing the risk of adverse health outcomes for both the woman
and baby.
B. Potential Consequences of Coerced Decision-Making During
Birth
When health care providers use coercive tactics to steer patients
toward a particular course of treatment, a number of negative
93.
94.
95.

96.

See Josh Gupta-Kagan, Toward a Public Health Legal Structure for Child Welfare, 92
NEB. L. REV. 897, 899–900 (2014).
See id. at 900.
See, e.g., Larissa MacFarquhar, When Should a Child Be Taken from His Parents?,
NEW YORKER (Aug. 7 & 14, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/08/0
7/when-should-a-child-be-taken-from-his-parents (discussing the delays and obstacles
parents face when seeking to regain custody after removal of a child by child welfare
authorities); I-Team: Family Separated After Family Court Closes Early, NBC N.Y.
(Oct. 17, 2013), https://www.nbcnewyork.com/on-air/as-seen-on/I-TEAM_-BudgetCuts-Delay-Family-Court-Hearings_-Unnecessarily-Traumatizing-Some-Children_Ne
w-York-228256391.html (discussing family court delays that prolong the separation
of parents and children). The consequences of such separations include the
interruption of breastfeeding and the ongoing traumatization of young children. ITeam: Family Separated After Family Court Closes Early, supra (discussing one
child’s fear of the doorbell after a baseless separation from her mother and four-daylong placement in foster care).
I-Team: Family Separated After Family Court Closes Early, supra note 95; see also
BDS Testifies Before Council Hearing on Abuse and Mistreatment of Women in City
Jails: Testimony of Kelsey DeAvila, BROOKLYN DEFENDER SERVICES (Dec. 15, 2015),
http://bds.org/category/testimony/ (describing, in the context of incarceration, how
separation of a breastfeeding infant from her mother “can be damaging to the child’s
development and dangerous to a mother’s mental health”).
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consequences may result.
Not only is the patient-provider
relationship degraded, but the woman—and by extension, her
family—may personally experience various harms. These include
physical harm resulting from the increased risk associated with the
unwanted medical treatment, emotional harm resulting from the
experience of coercion and any adverse outcomes, and the financial
burden of additional expenses incurred as a result of the unwanted
intervention. In addition, when coercion creeps into clinical
decision-making, it can erode trust in the medical profession as a
whole, discouraging people from seeking medical care, especially
critical prenatal care. It may deter pregnant women from seeking
care at the hospital, inhibit women from communicating openly with
their physicians, and contribute to the undermining of the principle of
informed consent that lies at the heart of modern medical care.
The potential chilling effect of child welfare threats on women’s
decision-making in childbirth is troubling, as some women will
submit to unwanted and unnecessary medical treatment out of fear of
similar consequences. The consequences are particularly severe for
poor women, women of color, and young women, as they are more
likely to have their parental fitness, good judgment, and even the
appropriateness of their pregnancies questioned and scrutinized by
authority figures, and therefore may be more susceptible to
interference in their medical decision-making. The remainder of this
Section considers the potential consequences of coercion during
childbirth for individual women and their families, as well as for the
medical system and public health more generally.
1.

Impact on Individual Women and Families
a.

Physical Harm

Medically unnecessary interventions, especially those involving
surgery, increase the risk of complications for women and babies.97
97.

See SAKALA & CORRY, supra note 60, at 4–5, 21. Research shows that the increase in
cesareans in the United States has not improved birth outcomes. Specifications
Manual for Joint Commission National Quality Measures, JOINT COMMISSION (2013),
https://manual.jointcommission.org/releases/TJC2013A/MIF0167.html (last visited
Dec. 30, 2017); see also SAKALA & CORRY, supra note 60, at 42 (“Recent analyses
substantiate the World Health Organization’s recommendation that optimal national
cesarean rates are in the range of 5 percent to 10 percent of all births and that rates
above 15 percent are likely to do more harm than good.”). Evidence-based research
has begun to document the extent to which cesareans are often unnecessary,
performed in non-emergent situations without clinical indication. See SAKALA &
CORRY, supra note 60, at 41–48.
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Women who have cesareans are more likely to experience death,
emergency hysterectomy, blood clots and stroke, surgical injury such
as bladder and uterine lacerations, hemorrhage, infection, and intense
and prolonged postpartum pain.98 They are also more likely to suffer
chronic pelvic pain and bowel obstruction than women who have
vaginal births.99 Cesareans require longer hospitalizations and more
healing time; rehospitalization in the sixty days following a cesarean
is almost twice as common as after a vaginal birth.100 Research
shows that cesareans also increase the risk of problems with future
reproduction and are associated with involuntary infertility, cesarean
scar ectopic pregnancy, placenta previa, placenta accreta, future
deliveries with low birthweight babies, preterm babies, and
stillbirths.101 A history of multiple cesareans is associated with
cumulative abdominal adhesion formation and an increased risk of
adverse reproductive effects.102 These outcomes disproportionately
affect religious women whose desire for large families is rooted in
their faith.103
Babies may also suffer an increased risk of physical harm as a
result of the coerced medical treatment provided to their mothers.
98.

99.
100.
101.

102.
103.

CAROL SAKALA, CHILDBIRTH CONNECTION, VAGINAL OR CESAREAN BIRTH?: A
SYSTEMATIC REVIEW TO DETERMINE WHAT IS AT STAKE FOR MOTHERS AND BABIES 3
(2006), https://pqcnc-documents.s3.amazonaws.com/sivbdoc/sivbeb/6ChildbirthConn
ectionEvidencereVaginalandCesareanBirth.pdf; see also, e.g., Anne Kjersti Daltveit et
al., Cesarean Delivery and Subsequent Pregnancies, 111 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY
1327, 1329–33 (2008) (describing study that found higher rates of uterine rupture and
placental complications after previous cesarean deliveries); Catherine DeneuxTharaux et al., Postpartum Maternal Mortality and Cesarean Delivery, 108
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 541, 544–47 (2006) (describing study that found a
“three-fold increase in the risk of postpartum maternal death” after caesarean birth).
SAKALA, supra note 98, at 3.
F. GARY CUNNINGHAM ET AL., WILLIAMS OBSTETRICS 592 (Andrea Seils et al. eds.,
McGraw-Hill Cos. 22d ed. 2005).
SAKALA, supra note 98, at 4; see also, e.g., Jeffrey L. Ecker & Fredric D. Frigoletto,
Jr., Cesarean Delivery and the Risk-Benefit Calculus, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 885, 888
(2007) (“[S]pecific objections to cesarean delivery include concern regarding a
mother’s future reproductive health, since later pregnancies are associated with
increased risks of miscarriage, ectopic gestation, placenta previa, and placenta
accreta.”); Robyn Kennare et al., Risks of Adverse Outcomes in the Next Birth After a
First Cesarean Delivery, 109 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 270, 272–74 (2007)
(noting that cesarean birth significantly increases risk for placenta previa and placenta
accreta when compared with vaginal birth and that cesarean birth infants also face
risks, including low birth weight and “higher risk of unexplained stillbirth”).
See SAKALA, supra note 98, at 4.
See TINA CASSIDY, BIRTH: THE SURPRISING HISTORY OF HOW WE ARE BORN 108
(2006) (describing an increase in potentially life-threatening placental abnormalities
in Mormon women who have previously given birth by cesarean).
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Babies born by cesarean are more likely to experience respiratory
problems, surgical injuries, and asthma during childhood and
adulthood.104 They also have higher rates of failure to establish
breastfeeding.105
Apart from cesareans, other unwanted interventions increase the
risk of physical harm to women. Research has linked episiotomies
with increased perineal injury, stitches, pain and tenderness, length of
healing, a likelihood of leaking stool or gas, and pain with
intercourse.106 Interventions such as continuous electronic fetal
monitoring, induction, and epidural can prompt the need for
additional procedures, leading to injury.107 Researchers use the term
“cascade of secondary interventions” to capture the idea that the
medical complexity of birth increases when additional interventions
are required to monitor and treat the side effects of the original
interventions.108 For example, one study found that among first-time
mothers who labored, 47% experienced an induction, and of those
who were induced, 78% had an epidural; among women who had
both an induction and an epidural, 31% ultimately had a cesarean.109
By contrast, women who experienced either an induction or an
epidural—but not both—had cesareans 19–20% of the time.110
Research shows that various interventions are routinely performed

104. SAKALA, supra note 98, at 3; SAKALA & CORRY, supra note 60, at 44; see also, e.g.,
James M. Alexander et al., Fetal Injury Associated with Cesarean Delivery, 108
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 885, 886 (2006) (“The most common injury [in cesarean
infants] was skin laceration . . . .”); Anne Kirkeby Hansen et al., Risk of Respiratory
Morbidity in Term Infants Delivered by Elective Caesarean Section: Cohort Study,
BMJ 3–4 (2008), http://www.bmj.com/content/bmj/336/7635/85.full.pdf (describing
study results which found that cesarean infants had increased risks for respiratory
morbidity when compared with infants born through vaginal delivery); Astrid
Sevelsted et al., Cesarean Section and Chronic Immune Disorders, PEDIATRICS 3–4
(2014), http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/content/pediatrics/early/2014/11/25/peds.
2014-0596.full.pdf (describing study results in which cesarean delivery was found to
significantly increase a child’s risk of asthma); Analysis Shows Possible Link Between
Rise in C-Sections and Increase in Late Preterm Birth, MARCH OF DIMES (Dec. 16,
2008), http://208.74.202.51/24497_25161.asp (discussing the link between cesarean
sections and increased preterm births).
105. SAKALA, supra note 98, at 3.
106. SAKALA & CORRY, supra note 60, at 49.
107. Id. at 39.
108. Id. at 28.
109. EUGENE R. DECLERCQ ET AL., CHILDBIRTH CONNECTION, LISTENING TO MOTHERS III:
PREGNANCY AND BIRTH 24 (2013), http://transform.childbirthconnection.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/06/LTM-III_Pregnancy-and-Birth.pdf.
110. Id.

268

UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 47

without evidence to support their safety and efficacy, or in situations
lacking a clinical indication for the treatment, reflecting the degree to
which childbirth in the United States has become a high-tech,
procedure-intensive experience for a significant majority of
women.111 Medical intervention can be life-saving and injurypreventing in circumstances where complications arise, but
intervention poses risk. When women are coerced into accepting
medical treatment they do not want, their risk of physical harm—and
in some instances, harm to their babies—increases, with the potential
for serious, lasting consequences.
b.

Emotional Harm

Coerced medical treatment can also cause emotional harm in the
form of fear, trauma, depression, and impaired recovery and
adjustment to parenthood. After she was informed that her hospital
intended to seek a court-ordered cesarean and a child welfare
investigation, Jennifer Goodall described her “feelings of deep
distress, concern, and fear for . . . [herself] and . . . [her] pregnancy
and . . . [her] family.”112 As Goodall experienced, emotional harm
may occur at the time of the coercive conduct or it may manifest later
in the pregnancy or postpartum period.
Mental health professionals increasingly recognize birth trauma as
a condition that interferes with postpartum well-being, often
requiring counseling or other treatment.113 Trauma during childbirth
can lead to Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), postpartum
depression, poor bonding and attachment, and difficulty with
breastfeeding.114 A national study of women during the postpartum
period found that up to 9% of respondents met the clinical criteria for

111. See Kukura, supra note 39, at 258–64.
112. Declaration of Jennifer Goodall, supra note 40, at 6, 11 (“I am now very near giving
birth without an attending physician and am afraid to go to Bayfront Health Port
Charlotte.”).
113. See Penny Simkin, Birth Trauma: Definition and Statistics, PATTCH: PREVENTION &
TREATMENT TRAUMATIC CHILDBIRTH, http://pattch.org/resource-guide/traumaticbirths-and-ptsd-definition-and-statistics/ (last visited Dec. 30, 2017).
114. Cheryl Tatano Beck et al., Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in New Mothers: Results
from a Two-Stage U.S. National Survey, 38 BIRTH: ISSUES IN PERINATAL CARE 216,
217 (2011) (“Birth trauma can also lead to distressing problems that hinder mothers’
breastfeeding attempts.”); Thompson, supra note 83 (describing the PTSD a woman
suffered after her forced episiotomy, in addition to physical complications from the
cutting itself); see also Dray Amicus Brief, supra note 84, at 34–35 (recounting
specific birth stories of women who experienced trauma and suffered flashbacks and
nightmares about giving birth).
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PTSD.115 Research shows a strong association between coercion and
postpartum PTSD.116 Researchers at the University of North Dakota
found that 34% of women reported symptoms of PTSD related to
their birth experience, concluding that “the strongest predictor of
developing PTSD after labor was not a history of trauma, but rather
the level of coercion the women experienced during their labor and
delivery.”117 Longer-term emotional distress resulting from birth
trauma may result in feelings of powerlessness and the desire to
avoid anything associated with the birth.118
In general, women who give birth by cesarean are more likely to
have poor overall mental health and functioning than women who
deliver vaginally.119 Women who have cesareans are more likely to
report a poor birth experience and have less early contact with their
babies, which impedes postpartum hormonal adjustment and
lactation.120 Immediate skin-to-skin contact between mother and
baby helps regulate newborn body temperature, reduces newborn
crying, improves breastfeeding effectiveness, and results in more
affectionate maternal behaviors.121 Although not all women and
babies are able to breastfeed, women who breastfeed experience
lower incidences of premenopausal breast cancer, ovarian cancer,
retained gestational weight gain, type-2 diabetes, and myocardial

115. Beck et al., supra note 114, at 217.
116. Id. at 222 (identifying pressure to induce labor and pressure to have an epidural as two
variables that differentiated women with high posttraumatic stress symptom levels).
117. Caught on Video: Improving Birth Breaks the Silence on Abuse of Women in
Maternity Care, IMPROVING BIRTH (Aug. 28, 2014), https://improvingbirth.org/2014/0
8/vid/ (describing a study that examined various risk factors, including history of
physical and sexual abuse or domestic violence, low socioeconomic status, age, and
education level).
118. See JENNIFER BLOCK, PUSHED: THE PAINFUL TRUTH ABOUT CHILDBIRTH AND MODERN
MATERNITY CARE 146–47 (2007) (summarizing the experiences of women who chose
not to celebrate their child’s first birthday due to painful associations with the
violence they experienced during childbirth).
119. SAKALA & CORRY, supra note 60, at 44; see also Jennifer Fenwick et al., Women’s
Experiences of Caesarean Section and Vaginal Birth After Caesarian: A Birthrites
Initiative, 9 INT’L J. NURSING PRAC. 10, 12 (2003) (“Seventy-eight percent . . . of the
women reported that their Caesarean section was both physically and emotionally
traumatic.”).
120. See SAKALA & CORRY, supra note 60, at 37 (discussing the functioning of natural
oxytocin production to produce postpartum hemorrhage and facilitate breastfeeding
and bonding); see also Kukura, supra note 39, at 268 (discussing negative impact of
cesarean on postpartum adjustment).
121. SAKALA & CORRY, supra note 60, at 55.
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infarction.122 Babies who breastfeed have a lower rate of infectious
morbidity and less risk of childhood obesity, diabetes, leukemia, and
sudden infant death syndrome.123 Early breastfeeding is associated
with greater breastfeeding success and longer duration of
breastfeeding.124
In childbirth, hormonal changes associated with the physiology of
labor and delivery mean that physical and emotional functioning are
highly interdependent. Women whose healthcare providers pressure
them to consent to treatment are at heightened risk of emotional
injury due to the experience of coercion, as well as possible adverse
emotional health and related physiological impacts suffered as a
result of the treatment itself.
c.

Financial Burden

Women who give birth by cesarean incur a greater financial burden
as a result of the surgery, longer hospitalization, and in some
instances, the costs associated with complications arising from the
surgery.125 Even when comparing uncomplicated deliveries, the cost
of a cesarean is significantly higher than the cost of a vaginal
delivery.126
In 2011, the average hospital charge for an
uncomplicated vaginal birth was $10,657, while the average cost of
an uncomplicated cesarean was $17,859.127 These amounts exclude
the cost of anesthesia, newborn care, or compensation for the services
of an obstetrician or midwife.128 Considering all childbirth costs
together, both commercial and Medicaid payers compensate
maternity care providers approximately 50% more for cesareans than
vaginal deliveries.129

122. See Alison Steube, The Risks of Not Breastfeeding for Mothers and Infants, 2
REVIEWS OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 222, 222 (2009).
123. Id.
124. See Jeannette T. Crenshaw, Health Birth Practice #6: Keep Mother and Baby
Together—It’s Best for Mother, Baby, and Breastfeeding, 23 J. PERINATAL EDUC. 211,
213 (2014).
125. SAKALA & CORRY, supra note 60, at 47.
126. Id.
127. Average Facility Labor and Birth Charge by Site and Method of Birth, United States,
2009-2011, CHILDBIRTH CONNECTION 1 (2013), http://transform.childbirthconnection.
org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/USCharges-chart-2009-2011.pdf (showing that the
average hospital charge for a complicated cesarean is $23,923).
128. Id.
129. TRUVEN HEALTH ANALYTICS, THE COST OF HAVING A BABY IN THE UNITED STATES:
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2013), http://transform.childbirthconnection.org/wp-content/u
ploads/2013/01/Cost-of-Having-a-Baby-Executive-Summary.pdf.
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Higher provider reimbursement rates for cesareans, along with
longer hospitalizations and more ancillary procedures, create
financial incentives to recommend cesareans even in the absence of
medical necessity.130 Indeed, research suggests that such incentives
do shape clinical decision-making whether or not providers are
conscious of the role that financial considerations play.131 Women
with private, fee-for-service insurance have cesareans at higher rates
than those who are insured by HMOs, Medicaid, or who are
uninsured.132 A California study revealed that for-profit hospitals
were more likely to perform cesareans than not-for-profit hospitals,
even for women experiencing low-risk pregnancies.133 Researchers
concluded that a woman who delivers at a for-profit hospital is 17%
more likely to give birth by cesarean than a woman who obtains care
at a not-for-profit institution.134
Because cesareans require longer hospitalization and involve a
more lengthy healing process—and indeed, are more likely to require
rehospitalization—families experience an increased burden
associated with caring for older children.135 This may increase the
financial strain on families facing higher-than-expected medical bills,
along with the associated stress.
Other non-cesarean medical intervention may also increase the
financial burden associated with childbirth. Under fee-for-service
reimbursement structures, various obstetric procedures—such as
artificial induction, administration of IV fluids, bladder
catheterization, rupture of membranes to release amniotic fluid, fetal
monitoring, episiotomy, shaving pubic hair, epidural anesthesia, and
forceps- or vacuum-assisted delivery—may all generate additional

130. SAKALA & CORRY, supra note 60, at 59–60.
131. See, e.g., Jonathan Gruber & Maria Owings, Physician Financial Incentives and
Cesarean Section Delivery, 27 RAND J. ECON. 99, 100 (1996).
132. Emmett B. Keeler & Mollyann Brodie, Economic Incentives in the Choice Between
Vaginal Delivery and Cesarean Section, 71 MILBANK Q. 365, 374, 374 tbl.1 (1993).
133. Nathanael Johnson, For-Profit Hospitals Performing More C-Sections, KAISER
HEALTH NEWS (Sept. 13, 2010), https://khn.org/news/californiawatch-profit-hospitalsperforming-more-c-sections/. Other studies have linked differences in cesarean rates
with the profit orientation of the hospital where a woman gives birth. See, e.g.,
Gruber & Owings, supra note 131, at 99 (analyzing the correlation between a fall in
fertility over the 1970–1982 period and the rise of cesarean delivery as an offset to
lost profit).
134. Johnson, supra note 133.
135. See SHEILA KITZINGER, THE COMPLETE BOOK OF PREGNANCY & CHILDBIRTH 355 (4th
ed. 2005) (discussing postpartum care after cesarean and six-week restriction on
heavy lifting).
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fees.136 When a woman feels pressure to accept a procedure that she
does not otherwise want, she must also bear the increased costs
associated with that procedure.
2.

Impact on Medical System and Public Health

In addition to the negative impact on women and their families,
coercion in the provider-patient relationship during childbirth poses a
threat to the medical system and public health more broadly. The
vast majority of women wish to give birth in a hospital, giving them
access to any medical care necessary to ensure the health and safety
of both mother and infant.137 When women experience coercion by
their maternity care providers—or hear other women recount threats
wielded against them during pregnancy and childbirth—pregnant
women lose trust in physicians, nurses, and hospitals.138 Some will
seek maternity care outside a hospital setting; in areas with midwifery
access, women may be able to give birth in a freestanding birth center
or at home with a trained attendant instead.139 But in the many areas
136. See Keeler & Brodie, supra note 132, at 365.
137. See MARIAN F. MACDORMAN ET AL., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NCHS DATA BRIEF NO. 144: TRENDS IN
OUT-OF-HOSPITAL BIRTHS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1990–2012, at 1 (2014),
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db144.pdf (reporting that 1.36% of births in
2012 occurred outside a hospital); see also Declaration of Jennifer Goodall, supra
note 40, at 7 (expressing Jennifer Goodall’s desire to give birth in a hospital attended
by medical professionals who are trained to respond appropriately in the event of an
emergency).
138. See, e.g., Jodi Jacobson, Florida Hospital Demands Woman Undergo Forced CSection, REWIRE (July 25, 2014, 5:04 PM), https://rewire.news/article/2014/07/25/flori
da-hospital-demands-woman-undergo-forced-c-section/. After her hospital threatened
legal action against her to force her to undergo a cesarean, Jennifer Goodall was
“terrified to enter a hospital.” Id.
139. Thirty-three states provide formal legal recognition of Certified Professional
Midwives (CPMs), who—unlike Certified Nurse Midwives (CNMs)—focus their
practice on out-of-hospital births. See CPMS Legal Status by State, BIG PUSH FOR
MIDWIVES,
http://pushformidwives.nationbuilder.com/cpms_legal_status_by_state
(last visited Dec. 30, 2017). There are fewer than 3,000 CPMs currently practicing in
the United States. Who Are CPMs, NAT’L ASS’N CERTIFIED PROF. MIDWIVES,
http://nacpm.org/about-cpms/who-are-cpms/ (last visited Dec. 30, 2017). In addition,
there are approximately eighty freestanding birth centers in the United States, where
women can give birth in low-intervention settings attended by either CPMs or CNMs.
See Susan Rutledge Stapleton et al., Outcomes of Care in Birth Centers:
Demonstration of a Durable Model, 58 J. MIDWIFERY & WOMEN’S HEALTH 3, 5
(2013); see also, e.g., Kukura, supra note 39, at 256–57 (providing background on the
options for out-of-hospital births, as well as the barriers women face when seeking
midwife-attended out-of-hospital births); Stacey A. Tovino, American Midwifery
Litigation and State Legislative Preferences for Physician-Controlled Childbirth, 11
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of the country where women have no options for midwifery care,
they may decide to give birth at home unassisted—with a higher risk
of adverse outcomes—move their families to a different state or
region,140 or forego future pregnancies out of fear.141
The World Health Organization has recognized that “disrespectful,
abusive or neglectful treatment . . . . [c]onstitutes a violation of trust
between women and their health-care providers and can also be a
powerful disincentive for women to seek and use maternal health care
services.”142 The violation of trust can also inhibit essential
communication between a pregnant woman and her doctor, as women
become less likely to disclose relevant sensitive information about
their health and pregnancies, such as smoking, alcohol use, and drug
use—both illicit drugs and legal medication.143 When a woman feels
safe to discuss issues that may impact fetal development and her own
well-being, physicians can offer appropriate information, counseling,
or treatment. Women who fail to disclose relevant information about
their health miss opportunities to receive smoking cessation support,
methadone treatment, or advice on how to safely continue taking

140.

141.

142.

143.

CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 61, 68–69 (2004) (discussing legal regulation that restricts
access to midwifery in certain areas).
Pemberton Video Recording, supra note 27 (discussing Pemberton’s decision to move
out-of-state after forced cesarean in the absence of a midwife willing to attend
Pemberton’s VBAC).
It is possible that some threats by hospitals and physicians are made with the purpose
of reducing their liability risk by encouraging the patient to go elsewhere for care. See
Diaz-Tello, supra note 24, at 216 (discussing threats of legal process as a liabilityminimizing tool that “mak[es] the prospect of delivering at that facility so frightful
that the pregnant person goes elsewhere”).
The Prevention and Elimination of Disrespect and Abuse During Facility-Based
Childbirth, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (2015) [hereinafter WHO STATEMENT],
http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/134588/1/WHO_RHR_14.23_eng.pdf?ua=1&
ua=1.
See Brief of Amici Curiae Nat’l Advocates for Pregnant Women & Experts in
Maternal & Child Health & Drug Treatment in Support of Appellant Melissa McCann
Arms at 10–14, Arms v. State, 471 S.W.3d 637 (Ark. 2015) (No. CR-15-124) (arguing
that provider threats of state intervention deter women from seeking critical prenatal
care); see also, e.g., Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 78 n.14 (2001)
(citing Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599–600 (1977)) (recognizing that being
reported to police by prenatal care providers “may have adverse consequences
because it may deter patients from receiving needed medical care”); Jaffee v.
Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1996) (upholding confidentiality of mental health
records because a “confidential relationship” is necessary for “successful
[professional] treatment,” and “the mere possibility of disclosure may impede
development of the confidential relationship necessary for successful treatment”).
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medication for mental illness—increasing the risk of impaired fetal
development, birth defects, and low birthweight.144
Finally, threats to leverage state power in order to secure consent to
medical treatment during pregnancy degrade the principle of
informed consent. As discussed in Part III, informed consent protects
patient autonomy and ensures respect for the right of patients to
direct the course of their own care. It is central to modern medical
care and respect for the value of patient dignity. Recognized in law
and enshrined in ethical guidance to medical professionals, informed
consent works when providers take their obligations seriously and
ensure that patient consent is obtained after full disclosure of the risks
and benefits of the proposed treatment, as well as the risks and
benefits of any alternatives.145 When a woman consents to treatment
out of fear of losing her child to the state, informed consent is an
empty promise.146 The potential for erosion of the principle of
informed consent threatens medical ethics and could have farreaching consequences beyond the maternity care context.
C. Data Gaps
Analyzing the problem of child welfare threats—and coercion more
generally—during childbirth is complicated by a lack of data on the
occurrence of such threats. Identifying when, where, and how health
care providers threaten state action against pregnant women is likely
hindered by the shame some women feel resulting from birth trauma,
but the bigger obstacle is how few people are asking the right
questions.147 This reflects the dearth of data on the broader
144. See, e.g., Patrick J. Sweeney et al., The Effect of Integrating Substance Abuse
Treatment with Prenatal Care on Birth Outcome, 20 J. PERINATOLOGY 219, 219–23
(2000) (reporting better pregnancy outcomes when women received drug treatment
and prenatal care).
145. See Kukura, supra note 17 (manuscript at 47–49, 51, 58, 61–63) (discussing the
limitations on legal enforcement of the right to informed consent and the need for
providers to uphold the principle even in the absence of possible legal sanction).
146. See Heather Joy Baker, Note, “We Don’t Want to Scare the Ladies:” An Investigation
of Maternal Rights and Informed Consent Throughout the Birth Process, 31 WOMEN’S
RTS. L. REP. 538, 540–41 (2010) (“If the repercussions for failure to consent to
cesarean section are so severe that children can be taken from their mothers, what is
the purpose of a consent form?”).
147. See Dray Amicus Brief, supra note 84, at 34–36 (describing types of emotional
suffering that women may experience after traumatic births, including humiliation,
degradation, and shame). Some women are reluctant to report mistreatment during
the birth of their children out of fear that complaining will be perceived as
ungratefulness about the birth of the baby, reflecting the oft-repeated sentiment that “a
healthy baby is all that matters,” even in the face of birth-related injuries suffered by
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phenomenon of obstetric violence, where a lack of research on the
issue impedes efforts to assess the scope of the problem and develop
effective interventions.148 Nevertheless, existing research and data
collection suggest that child welfare threats and other forms of
coercion during birth are sufficiently prevalent to be taken seriously.
The few studies that have considered women’s experiences of
coercion during childbirth show that provider pressure to agree to
medical treatment is not uncommon. A 2013 study found that 25%
of women who had experienced labor induction or cesarean felt
pressure by their health care provider to accept those interventions.149
A 2014 study reported that women who experienced pressure to
consent to a cesarean were more than 5 times more likely to have
one, more than 6 times more likely to have one without a medical
basis, and almost 7 times more likely to have an unplanned
cesarean.150 Reflecting the extent to which health care providers are
able to assert their preferences upon their patients, 20% of women
who were induced and 38% of women who had cesareans reported to
researchers that their care provider made the “final decision” about
their treatment.151 Together, this research suggests that provider
coercion contributes to the high rates of medical intervention in
maternity care in the United States. It also supports the conclusion
that a significant number of women bear the increased risks of
cesarean surgery without medical necessity and contrary to their
wishes.
Other research suggests that provider preferences have a significant
influence on women’s decision-making during childbirth;
specifically, the manner in which a health care provider presents risks
and whether he or she is perceived to support a particular course of
treatment shapes women’s ultimate decisions. One study compared
good candidates for VBAC who chose a repeat cesarean with those
who chose a trial of labor, finding that maternity care providers
strongly influence women’s choice of delivery method, distinct from

148.
149.
150.

151.

the mother. See Kukura, supra note 17 (manuscript at 44–45) (discussing social
expectations of self-sacrificing mothers and the disregard of maternal birth injuries in
the presence of a healthy baby).
See Kukura, supra note 17 (manuscript at 29–33) (discussing the lack of research on
obstetric violence in the United States).
DECLERCQ ET AL., supra note 109, at 35.
Judy Jou et al., Patient-Perceived Pressure from Clinicians for Labor Induction and
Cesarean Delivery: A Population-Based Survey of U.S. Women, 50 HEALTH SERVICES
RES. 961, 969–71 (2015).
DECLERCQ ET AL., supra note 109, at 38 tbl.16.
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the actual risk presented in the individual situations.152 Researchers
suggested that the repeat cesarean rate among study subjects could
have decreased from 70.4% to 25.5% if their health care providers
had exhibited support for VBAC.153 Another study concluded that
women were extremely likely to choose repeat cesarean if they
understood it to be their doctor’s preferred approach, with only 4% of
women who perceived a physician preference for surgery actually
attempting a VBAC.154
Not all women are impacted by provider coercion to the same
degree. First, certain women are more likely to be threatened with
state intervention in their medical decision-making. Young women,
women of color, and poor women, who may already live with
extensive surveillance by the state in order to receive public benefits,
are more likely to receive child welfare threats and to encounter
difficult decisions about whether to accept unwanted treatment—and
the increased risk of complications—in order to avoid the risk of
losing their children.155
Second, certain women are more likely to succumb to provider
pressure due to their vulnerability. Although research suggests that
provider preferences may influence all women, regardless of
background or status, it is likely that women with fewer resources,
weaker support networks, and less perception of power in the
treatment relationship will agree to unwanted treatment in the face of
coercion.156 This includes uninsured women and Medicaid recipients
who do not have a preexisting relationship with the treating doctor,
women without resources to hire a doula for emotional support
throughout childbirth, young women, immigrant women, and women
who have no or limited English language skills.157
The
disproportionate risk of coercion faced by such women is supported
by global research on maternal health, which suggests that certain
categories of women may be more vulnerable to mistreatment by
152. Torri D. Metz et al., How Do Good Candidates for Trial of Labor After Cesarean
(TOLAC) Who Undergo Elective Repeat Cesarean Differ from Those Who Chose
TOLAC?, 208 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 458.e1, 458.e4–e5 (2013).
153. Id. at 458.e5.
154. Sarah Bernstein et al., Trial of Labor After Previous Cesarean Section Versus Repeat
Cesarean Section: Are Patients Making an Informed Decision?, 206 AM J.
OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY S21, S21 (Jan. 2012 Supp.).
155. See generally, e.g., BRIDGES, supra note 82 (discussing the many ways poor women
are deprived of reproductive privacy); DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE
COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE (2002) (arguing that African Americans are
disproportionately represented in the child welfare system).
156. WHO STATEMENT, supra note 142.
157. See id.
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their health care providers—especially young women, poor women,
unmarried women, women with HIV, and women who belong to
racial, ethnic, and religious minorities.158
There are reasons to think that coercion in maternity care will
continue to be a problem and may even increase in frequency. First,
the high degree of medicalization in modern maternity care means
that there are a variety of decision points during labor and delivery
when intervention may be recommended by a health care provider
without a strong evidence basis supporting its use.159 Of all hospital
procedures performed on individuals aged 18–44 in 2005, 49% were
obstetric procedures.160 Six of the fifteen most common hospital
procedures for the entire population are associated with childbirth.161
Indeed, the most common operating room procedure is cesarean
surgery; in 2013, 32.7% of all babies in the United States were born
by cesarean.162
Second, and relatedly, growing concern about record-high cesarean
rates and the number of medically unnecessary inductions and
surgeries performed each year have focused more public attention on
maternal health and birthing rights.163 Indeed, a growing consumer
158. Id.; see also Jenna Murray de Lopez, “Birth is like a Battle of the Ancient Maya”:
Obstetric Violence in South East Mexico 17 (undated) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with author) (reporting results of qualitative anthropological study of obstetric
violence that suggested women’s experiences of violence, and the frequency of such
violations, “are informed by their status and treatment in the wider society”).
159. See Kukura, supra note 39, at 258–60 (discussing the introduction of childbirth
interventions without adequate study and regional variations in cesarean rates that
suggest “a pattern of almost random decision making” for the use of cesarean
surgery).
160. SAKALA & CORRY, supra note 60, at 11.
161. Id. at 11–12.
162. JOYCE A. MARTIN ET AL., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., BIRTHS: FINAL DATA FOR 2013, at 7 (2015),
https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr64/nvsr64_01.pdf.
163. See, e.g., AM. COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS & SOC’Y FOR MATERNAL
FETAL MED., NO. 1, OBSTETRIC CARE CONSENSUS: SAFE PREVENTION OF THE PRIMARY
CESAREAN DELIVERY (2014), https://www.acog.org/-/media/Obstetric-CareConsensus-Series/oc001.pdf?dmc=1&ts=20180120T2122047688
(“[T]he
rapid
increase in cesarean birth rates from 1996 to 2011 without clear evidence of
concomitant decreases in maternal or neonatal morbidity or mortality raises
significant concern that cesarean delivery is overused.”); Anna Almendrala, U.S. CSection Rate Is Double What WHO Recommends, HUFFPOST (Apr. 16, 2015),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/04/14/c-section-rate-recommendation_n_70589
54.html; Rosenberg, supra note 2; Megan Thielking, Sky-High C-Section Rates in the
US Don’t Translate to Better Birth Outcomes, STAT (Dec. 1, 2015),
https://www.statnews.com/2015/12/01/cesarean-section-childbirth/.
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advocacy movement is engaging the public in education and
advocacy about the over-medicalization of childbirth in the United
States and encouraging women to share their negative birth
experiences.164 Armed with more information about common
childbirth interventions, more women are likely to question or
challenge their doctors about the necessity of medical intervention,
leading to more conflict between pregnant women and their health
care providers.165 As birth conflicts become even more common, it is
likely that more providers will consider it necessary to resort to
threats of judicial or child welfare intervention in order to convince
patients to follow their treatment advice.
III. LEGAL AND ETHICAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF
MATERNITY CARE PROVIDERS
Making child welfare threats and other coercive tactics used to
secure a pregnant woman’s agreement to treatment violate
physicians’ legal and ethical responsibilities. Although health care
providers are generally under no legal obligation to begin treating an
individual seeking care,166 once they do undertake to provide health
care services, the law requires them to provide care for patients in an
existing treatment relationship.167 As they treat patients, physicians
164. See Kukura, supra note 17 (manuscript at 31–32) (discussing the recent founding of
three organizations to address obstetric violence in a four-year period, joining
established groups advocating for maternity care reform). The groups are Improving
Birth, Human Rights in Childbirth, and the Birth Rights Bar Association. Id.
(manuscript at 31).
165. See, e.g., Diaz-Tello, supra note 59, at 57–59 (describing the experiences of Rinat
Dray and Michelle Mitchell, who made educated decisions in declining medical
intervention, despite their health care providers’ adamant insistence to the contrary).
166. See, e.g., Childs v. Weis, 440 S.W.2d 104, 107 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969) (“Since it is
unquestionably the law that the relationship of physician and patient is dependent
upon contract, . . . a physician is not to be held liable for arbitrarily refusing to
respond to a call of a person even urgently in need of medical or surgical assistance
provided that the relation of physician and patient does not exist at the time . . . .”).
There are statutory exceptions to this common law rule, such as the federal
Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act, which obligates providers to care for
someone in certain emergency circumstances. EMTALA, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2012).
167. See, e.g., Ricks v. Budge, 64 P.2d 208, 211 (Utah 1937) (“We believe the law is well
settled that a physician or surgeon, upon undertaking an operation or other case, is
under the duty, in the absence of an agreement limiting the service, of continuing his
attention, after the first operation or first treatment, so long as the case requires
attention.”). The law recognizes a small number of circumstances under which the
treatment relationship may be ended without violating this legal duty. Id. at 211–12
(noting the obligation can be terminated when the need for medical care has ceased,
when the patient has discharged the physician, or when the physician withdraws “after
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are bound by certain legal and ethical obligations. These obligations
shape the provider-patient relationship, as well as clinical decisionmaking about the patient’s course of treatment. Before administering
medical care, a physician must obtain the patient’s informed consent
to the treatment.168 Failure to do so may result in a legal claim by the
patient under tort law, although the legal requirements for proving a
violation of informed consent are sufficiently onerous that routine
violations are unlikely to result in successful claims.169 Nevertheless,
this legal duty applies to physicians across medical practice areas and
establishes standards that are fundamental to patient counseling and
treatment.170 In addition to the legal requirement to obtain informed
consent, physician conduct is also guided by ethical standards issued
by the professional medical associations relevant to their area of
practice.171 In some instances, such professional standard-setting
results in enforceable rules; elsewhere, the policy statements and
ethical guidance of professional organizations are merely advisory
but, under certain circumstances, can be considered as evidence of
the standard of care governing physician conduct in legal
proceedings.172 This section will explore the legal doctrine of
informed consent and the guidance of the two most important
professional associations relevant to obstetric practice.
A. Informed Consent
Informed consent doctrine has shaped modern medical care,
transforming the way physicians interact with their patients and view

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

giving the patient reasonable notice so as to enable the patient to secure other medical
attention”).
See Bryan Murray, Informed Consent: What Must a Physician Disclose to a Patient?,
14 AM. MED. ASS’N J. ETHICS 563, 563 (2012).
See id.
See id.
See infra Section III.B (discussing professional ethical guidelines).
See, e.g., Gallardo v. United States, 752 F.3d 865, 880 (10th Cir. 2014) (discussing,
approvingly, the district court’s reliance on an ACOG bulletin in establishing standard
of care in a malpractice action); Bergman v. Kelsey, 873 N.E.2d 486, 503 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2007) (acknowledging ACOG guidelines established standard of care in medical
malpractice suit). See generally Peter Moffett & Gregory Moore, The Standard of
Care: Legal History and Definitions: The Bad and Good News, 12 W.J. EMERGENCY
MED. (2011) (discussing clinical practice guidelines and the standard of care for
emergency medicine readership).
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their role in medical decision-making.173 It evolved to protect patient
autonomy and to ensure that patients can conduct their own medical
decision-making.174 In contrast to the historical approach to medical
decision-making, which reflected paternalistic assumptions that the
doctor knows best and should be the decision-maker on behalf of the
patient, the requirement of informed consent recognizes that
physicians’ greater knowledge and expertise demand added
protection for the patient as the less powerful player in the treatment
relationship.175
Justice Cardozo expressed the basic principle underlying informed
consent in Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, stating:
“Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to
determine what shall be done with his own body.”176 The
requirement of informed consent imposes a duty on physicians “to
volunteer . . . the information the patient needs for intelligent
decision.”177 In other words, it is not simply enough to answer
patients’ questions; the physician must proactively provide
information to inform patient decision-making. Some jurisdictions
have developed a patient-based model of informed consent, which
requires disclosure of the information relevant to the patient’s
decision about medical treatment,178 in contrast to a physician-based
model of informed consent, which requires disclosure of information
“a reasonable medical practitioner of the same school, in the same or
similar circumstances, would have disclosed.”179 A patient-based
173. See Julie Gantz, Note, State Statutory Preclusion of Wrongful Birth Relief: A
Troubling Re-Writing of a Woman’s Right to Choose and the Doctor-Patient
Relationship, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 795, 800–01 (1997).
174. Id. at 800 (discussing the evolution from physician control and autonomy to norm of
information disclosure as “a fundamental ethical requirement”).
175. See Sylvia A. Law, Childbirth: An Opportunity for Choice That Should Be Supported,
32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 345, 363–65 (2008) (discussing the tradition of
paternalism and disrespect for women’s choices in reproductive health care, especially
childbirth).
176. 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914).
177. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 783 n.36 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (“Physicians and
hospitals have patients of widely divergent socio-economic backgrounds, and a rule
which presumes a degree of sophistication which many members of society lack is
likely to breed gross iniquities.”).
178. See id. at 782 (shifting the emphasis of informed consent law to the individualized
needs of the patient).
179. Guebard v. Jabaay, 452 N.E.2d 751, 755 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983); see also, e.g., Jaime
Staples King & Benjamin W. Moulton, Rethinking Informed Consent: The Case for
Shared Medical Decision-Making, 32 AM. J.L. & MED. 429, 480–83 (2006)
(examining the physician-based and patient-based models of informed consent);
Richard Weinmeyer, Lack of Standardized Informed Consent Practices and Medical
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model of informed consent encourages physicians to consider the
individual characteristics of the patient, including any personal,
family, religious, or other considerations that might bear on what
information that person needs in order to make an informed choice
about medical care.180
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that a competent
person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing
unwanted medical treatment.181 In its reasoning, the Court noted that
courts had recognized the “right to refuse treatment either solely on
the common-law right to informed consent or on both the commonlaw right and a constitutional privacy right.”182 Drawing on common
law precedent to locate the constitutional right in the Fourteenth
Amendment’s substantive due process protections, the Court held
that “[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by
the common law, than the right of every individual to the possession
and control of his own person.”183
The doctrine of informed consent applies across the medical
profession with no exceptions for childbirth-related medical care.184
The American Medical Association (AMA) states unequivocally that
“[i]nformed consent is a basic policy in both ethics and law that
physicians must honor, unless the patient is unconscious or otherwise
incapable of consenting and harm from failure to treat is
imminent.”185 Informed consent requires the physician “to present
the medical facts accurately to the patient or to the individual
responsible for the patient’s care and to make recommendations for
management in accordance with good medical practice.”186 This
means that patients have the right to be informed about a proposed
treatment, including its purpose, risks, and benefits, as well as the
potential risks and benefits of any alternative courses of treatment,
including the decision to decline care.187

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Malpractice, 16 AM. MED. ASS’N J. ETHICS 120, 121 (2014) (noting that
approximately half of states apply a reasonable medical practitioner standard).
See King & Moulton, supra note 179, at 482–83.
Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990).
Id. at 271.
Id. at 269 (quoting Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)).
Am. Med. Ass’n, Opinion 8.08 – Informed Consent, as published in 14 AM. MED.
ASS’N J. ETHICS 555, 555 (2012) [hereinafter AMA Opinion 8.08].
Id.
Id.
AM. MED. ASS’N, OPINION NO. 2.1.1, INFORMED CONSENT (2016) [hereinafter AMA,
OPINION NO. 2.1.1, INFORMED CONSENT], https://www.ama-assn.org/sites/default/files
/media-browser/code-of-medical-ethics-chapter-2.pdf.

282

UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 47

In order for the right to informed consent to be meaningful, courts
must recognize its necessary corollary—the right to informed refusal
of medical treatment. When a physician properly discloses the risks,
benefits, and alternatives to a proposed course of treatment but is
unwilling to respect a patient’s refusal of treatment after such
disclosure, any “consent” obtained from the patient cannot be
considered true informed consent. Some courts recognize that health
care providers should not be held liable in tort for good-faith
compliance with a competent patient’s informed refusal of treatment,
even if a preventable adverse outcome results.188 But some courts
have been unwilling to hold providers liable for violations of
informed consent where the violation involves a physician overriding
a pregnant woman’s informed refusal.189 In such cases, courts often
import reasoning from a separate area of the law—abortion
jurisprudence—to assert the state’s interest in protecting potential
life, as recognized in constitutional doctrine on abortion.190 This
unwillingness to recognize informed treatment refusals presents an
ongoing obstacle to faithful adherence to the legal requirement of
informed consent.191
Nevertheless, physicians are subject to the legal requirement to
obtain informed consent before providing medical care. When
doctors make child welfare threats or use other coercive means to
secure a woman’s agreement to medical treatment during childbirth,
they are violating their legal obligation to respect the patient’s right
to provide or withhold her informed consent.
B. Professional Ethical Guidelines
In addition to their legal duties, health care providers are bound by
medical ethics. Professional medical bodies have articulated the
188. See, e.g., Stamford Hosp. v. Vega, 674 A.2d 821, 832 (Conn. 1996) (“The hospital’s
interests were sufficiently protected by Vega’s informed choice, and neither it nor the
trial court was entitled to override that choice.”); In re Dubreuil, 629 So. 2d 819, 823–
24 (Fla. 1993) (“When a health care provider, acting in good faith, follows the wishes
of a competent and informed patient to refuse medical treatment, the health care
provider is acting appropriately and cannot be subjected to civil or criminal
liability.”).
189. See Dray v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., No. 500510/14, at 13 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 15,
2015) (“This court thus rejects plaintiff’s assertion that she had an absolute right to
reject medical care necessary to protect her viable fetus.”).
190. See Kukura, supra note 17 (manuscript at 58–61) (analyzing the flawed analogy
between compelled treatment in pregnancy and abortion rights).
191. See Dray Amicus Brief, supra note 84, at 7–8, 21–25 (discussing the need for courts
to consistently recognize an informed refusal of treatment as part of informed consent
and enforce liability against providers who violate an informed refusal).
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ethical obligations physicians have to their patients, providing
guidance to inform how health care providers should deal with
difficult cases. This professional ethical guidance affirms the
centrality of informed consent and strongly cautions against resorting
to judicial involvement in pregnancy decision-making. Statements
by the leading organizations relevant to obstetrics, the AMA and the
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG),
suggest that threats of intervention by child welfare authorities made
in order to coerce a woman’s consent to treatment also violate a
physician’s ethical obligations.
In 1987, the ACOG Ethics Committee published Opinion No. 55
on informed consent and the use of force against pregnant women.192
Responding to the prominent case of Angela Carder, whose courtordered cesarean was subsequently vacated by the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals,193 the Ethics Committee clarified that
“resort to the courts is almost never justified.”194 It expressed
concern that judicial action interferes with the doctor-patient
relationship and infringes women’s rights, noting that “inappropriate
reliance on judicial authority” to force treatment can result in
“undesirable societal consequences, such as the criminalization of
noncompliance with medical recommendations.”195 The Ethics
Committee called on obstetricians to “refrain from performing
procedures that are unwanted by a pregnant woman.”196 Although
the statement does not expressly condemn the use of other coercive
tactics to secure consent to treatment, it makes clear that ACOG
opposes the use of judicial intervention to force medical treatment on
pregnant women.197
Several decades later, the ACOG Ethics Committee released
Committee Opinion No. 321, “Maternal Decision Making, Ethics,
and the Law,” which stated that “[p]regnant women’s autonomous
decisions should be respected.”198 The Committee directed that
192. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists Comm. on Ethics, Patient Choice:
Maternal-Fetal Conflict (1987), published at 1 WOMEN’S HEALTH ISSUES 13–15
(1990) [hereinafter Patient Choice].
193. See supra Section II.A.
194. Patient Choice, supra note 192, at 14 (noting that court orders have a “destructive
effect” on the physician-patient relationship).
195. Id. at 15.
196. Id.
197. See id.
198. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists Comm. on Ethics, Committee Opinion
No. 321: Maternal Decision Making, Ethics, and the Law, 106 OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY 1127, 1135 (2005) [hereinafter Committee Opinion No. 321].
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“[c]oncerns about the impact of maternal decisions on fetal wellbeing should be discussed in the context of medical evidence and
understood within the context of each woman’s broad social network,
cultural beliefs, and values.”199 This guidance reinforces ACOG’s
view that coercion in the form of judicial intervention is generally
inappropriate in the treatment context, stating that “judicial authority
should not be used to implement treatment regimens aimed at
protecting the fetus, for such actions violate the pregnant woman’s
autonomy.”200 Despite this strong warning, the Committee again
leaves a narrow exception to the rule against compelled treatment,
noting, however, that it “cannot currently imagine” what type of
“extraordinary circumstances” would justify leveraging judicial
power on behalf of the fetus.201 Subsequently, in updated VBAC
guidelines issued in 2010, ACOG affirmed that “patients should be
allowed to accept increased levels of risk” out of respect for patient
autonomy.202 This means that it is for patients to decide whether or
not to have a cesarean, even for women who are not considered
optimal candidates for a trial of labor under ACOG guidelines.203
Although ACOG’s guidelines are not linked to an enforcement
mechanism, they may constitute evidence of the applicable standard
of ethical conduct in a proceeding to determine whether a physician
has committed professional misconduct.204 They also “establish a
profession’s collective vision of appropriate care and thus serve as a
tacit indictment of practices that significantly diverge from these
standards.”205
Shortly after the ACOG Ethics Committee released Opinion No.
55, the AMA Board of Trustees issued a policy statement that judicial
involvement in medical decision-making during childbirth “is
inappropriate when a woman has made an informed refusal of a
medical treatment designed to benefit her fetus.”206 The Board stated
that “[t]he physician’s duty is to provide appropriate information, . . .
not to dictate the woman’s decision.”207 The AMA Board’s

199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Id.
Id.
Id.
ACOG Practice Bulletin, supra note 39, at 457.
See id.
See David Orentlicher, The Influence of a Professional Organization on Physician
Behavior, 57 ALB. L. REV. 583, 592 (1994).
205. Oberman, supra note 16, at 492.
206. Am. Med. Ass’n Bd. of Trs., Legal Interventions During Pregnancy, 264 J. AM. MED.
ASS’N 2663, 2670 (1990).
207. Id.
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statement left open the possibility of an “exceptional circumstance”
when it might be appropriate for a maternity care provider to secure
judicial intervention;208 however such an exception was limited to
cases where the “treatment poses an insignificant or no health risk to
the woman, entails a minimal invasion of her bodily integrity, and
would clearly prevent substantial and irreversible harm to her
fetus.”209 Though not enforceable on its own, the statement
advocates a high bar for judicial intervention. The AMA Board
statement does not discuss child welfare threats as a form of coercion
against laboring women, but the same logic regarding judicial
intervention would presumably apply to provider threats to leverage
state power against a pregnant woman in the form of child welfare
investigation and removal.
Outside of the pregnancy-specific context, the AMA’s Council on
Ethical and Judicial Affairs (AMA Council) recognizes a patient’s
right to refuse medical treatment, even if the result of such refusal is
an avoidable death.210 The AMA Council’s Code of Ethics takes the
view that personal values and circumstances lead different patients to
reach different decisions.211 In this regard, courts have cited the
Code of Ethics when recognizing a patient’s right to refuse
treatment.212 The Code of Ethics also includes provisions regarding
the right of a patient to receive information and the patient’s right to
make her own decisions regarding a treating physician’s
recommendation.213 In Opinion No. 1.1.3, which addresses the
fundamental elements of the patient-physician relationship, the AMA
also identifies the patient’s “right . . . [t]o courtesy, respect, dignity,
208. Id.
209. Id. (“[T]he fundamental principle against compelled medical procedures should
control in all cases that do not present such exceptional circumstances.”).
210. COUNCIL ON ETHICAL & JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AM. MED. ASS’N, CODE OF MEDICAL
ETHICS: CURRENT OPINIONS WITH ANNOTATIONS, 8.08, at 134–35 (1998–1999 ed.
1998) (“The patient should make his or her own determination on treatment.”).
211. Id. at 135 (“Rational, informed patients should not be expected to act uniformly, even
under similar circumstances, in agreeing to or refusing treatment.”).
212. See, e.g., In re Lyle A., 830 N.Y.S.2d 486, 493 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2006) (citing AMA
Code of Ethics section 8.08 to conclude that the mother had the right to withdraw
consent to administration of a psychotropic drug to the minor patient).
213. AM. MED. ASS’N, OPINION NO. 1.1.3, PATIENT RIGHTS (2016) [hereinafter AMA,
OPINION NO. 1.1.3, PATIENT RIGHTS], https://www.ama-assn.org/sites/default/files/me
dia-browser/code-of-medical-ethics-chapter-1.pdf; see also AM. MED. ASS’N, OPINION
NO. 1.1.1, PATIENT-PHYSICIAN RELATIONSHIPS (2016), https://www.ama-assn.org/sites
/default/files/media-browser/code-of-medical-ethics-chapter-1.pdf (“The practice of
medicine . . . is fundamentally a moral activity that arises from the imperative to care
for patients and to alleviate suffering.”).
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and timely, responsive attention to his or her needs.”214 Violating the
Code of Ethics may lead to “discipline by the AMA[] and by . . .
county and state medical societies”; further, some states incorporate
the AMA Code of Ethics into their medical practice acts, creating the
possibility for official discipline for physicians who violate the
Code.215
Both ACOG and the AMA have published general guidance to
their members on the meaning of informed consent. In its Opinion
No. 108, entitled Ethical Dimensions of Informed Consent, ACOG
confirms that informed consent “respects a patient’s moral right to
bodily integrity, [and] to self-determination regarding sexuality and
reproductive capacities.”216 The AMA’s Code of Medical Ethics
recognizes that “[t]he patient’s right of self-decision can be
effectively exercised only if the patient possesses enough information
to enable an informed choice.”217 It identifies the physician’s
“ethical obligation to help the patient make choices . . . consistent
with good medical practice.”218 The AMA advises physicians on the
substantive aspects of informed consent, calling on physicians to
discuss the risks and benefits of a proposed treatment, any
alternatives regardless of cost or insurance coverage, the risks and
benefits of any alternative treatments, and the risks and benefits of
foregoing treatment.219 In doing so, the AMA also reminds
physicians that the process of securing informed consent is not only
an ethical obligation but also a legal requirement in all fifty states.220
The public statements of leading professional medical
organizations reinforce the importance of a physician’s legal duty to
obtain informed consent and provide necessary ethical guidance to
physicians caring for a patient who refuses medical treatment. The
obligation to respect patient autonomy and abide by a patient’s
informed refusal applies in maternity care just as in other aspects of
medical practice.221 Although pregnancy care is complicated by
concern for fetal well-being, these expert bodies cannot identify a
214. AMA, OPINION NO. 1.1.3, PATIENT RIGHTS, supra note 213.
215. Orentlicher, supra note 204, at 592.
216. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, Ethical Dimensions of Informed
Consent: Committee Opinion No. 108, 39 INT’L J. GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS 346,
346 (1992).
217. AMA Opinion 8.08, supra note 184, at 555.
218. Id.
219. AMA, OPINION NO. 2.1.1, INFORMED CONSENT, supra note 187.
220. Id.
221. See Benjamin Grant Chojnacki, Note, Pushing Back: Protecting Maternal Autonomy
from the Living Room to the Delivery Room, 23 CLEV.-MARSHALL C.L. J.L. & HEALTH
45, 69–70 (2010).
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circumstance in which it would be appropriate to use judicial
authority to override a woman’s cesarean refusal—arguably the most
invasive medical intervention into childbirth. The use of child
welfare threats to secure consent to treatment should be considered
akin to obtaining a court-ordered cesarean, as such threats attempt to
leverage state power to force a woman’s consent to medical care. In
this way, child welfare threats to coerce consent violate health care
providers’ legal and ethical obligations.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
The experiences of women like Jennifer Goodall and V.M. suggest
that there is a major disconnect between the legal and ethical
obligations of physicians and the reality of what occurs in some
clinical settings. Without a formal judicial determination on the
validity of a cesarean refusal as a basis for a child neglect finding,
some health care providers perceive that making child welfare threats
is a permissible strategy for securing a pregnant woman’s consent to
medical treatment, or at least perceive that such threats will not
prompt any form of sanction from legal or regulatory authorities. To
alter this perception requires a multi-pronged approach that involves
education, data collection, and the use of administrative mechanisms
to lodge formal complaints, in addition to continued legal advocacy
in the courts as appropriate cases arise.
A. Education and Training
Curbing the use of coercive tactics by maternity care providers
requires targeted education, both within the field of medicine and
among other stakeholders. Such education should include at least
two different aspects of the problem. First, doctors and nurses
working in maternity care settings, along with the hospital
administrators who oversee their care, need to be familiar with the
latest scientific research on VBAC, cesareans, and other forms of
medical intervention during childbirth, such as medical induction,
episiotomy, and the use of continuous electronic fetal monitoring.
Research suggests that the incorporation of medical research results
into practice is a slow process, sometimes taking up to two decades
before clinical practice is adjusted to reflect the best available
evidence.222 All providers, whether still in training or several
222. Translating Research into Practice (TRIP)-II, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM.
SERVICES (Mar. 2001), http://archive.ahrq.gov/research/findings/factsheets/translating/
tripfac/trip2fac.html.
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decades into their careers, should be familiar with evidence-based
maternity care practices, especially those more recent research results
that contradict conventional wisdom about the safety of certain
practices and support fewer interventions into the labor and delivery
process.223 Familiarity with evidence-based maternity care practices
may help reduce conflict over treatment decisions in situations where
a physician applies a traditional interventionist framework and a
patient relies on more recent research about the risks associated with
an interventionist approach. The need for ongoing education
regarding evidence-based practices should include members of
hospital legal and risk management departments, who may be
accustomed to operating under the assumption that performing a
cesarean—even over a woman’s objection—is safer than vaginal
delivery, despite evidence to the contrary.224
Second, medical education should include training about the harms
associated with coercion in maternity care. This includes the
heightened risk of PTSD and other birth trauma that is associated
with women feeling coerced by their health care providers during
childbirth.225 It also includes the potential harm to provider-patient
trust and physicians’ ability to provide care effectively.226 Such
efforts to train health care providers and hospital administrators about
issues related to maternity care decision-making would complement
ongoing consumer education by non-profit advocacy groups
dedicated to improving childbirth experiences and reducing adverse
health outcomes in maternity care.
B. Data Collection
A significant obstacle to ending the use of coercive means to obtain
consent during childbirth is the incomplete nature of data collection
regarding maternity care practices and childbirth experiences. The
United States lacks comprehensive data on obstetric practices and
even on maternal health outcomes, which impedes efforts both inside

223. See Kukura, supra note 39, at 267–80 (discussing best available research on various
childbirth interventions).
224. Should research reveal that actual reporting to child welfare authorities is occurring
with some degree of frequency—as opposed to simply threatening to report a woman
for refusing treatment—training for child welfare agencies about evidence-based
maternity care and the ethical dimensions of maternity care decision making might
also be necessary.
225. See supra Section II.B.1.b.
226. See supra notes 142–44 and accompanying text.
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and outside the field of medicine to improve maternity care.227
Medical coding practices that fail to distinguish between scheduled
cesareans, emergency cesareans, and post-induction cesareans, or
between spontaneous and induced vaginal births, prevent researchers
and maternity care consumers from reaching a robust understanding
of the risks and benefits of interventions like medical induction and
cesarean surgery.228
There is also a need for more qualitative research on women’s birth
experiences in order to understand how women feel coerced into
accepting unwanted medical treatment and the frequency with which
this occurs.
In 2002, the non-profit organization Childbirth
Connection conducted a survey of women’s birth experiences, which
for the first time documented the frequency of many practices that
had not previously been recorded.229 Childbirth Connection has
subsequently updated the survey twice, in 2006 and 2013, enabling
them to track trends over that time period and also ask more nuanced
questions informed by the results of previous surveys.230 The
Listening to Mothers surveys capture a more complete account of
various childbirth interventions than had previously been available
and have provided several useful data points about pregnant women’s
227. See, e.g., AMNESTY INT’L, DEADLY DELIVERY: THE MATERNAL HEALTH CARE CRISIS IN
THE USA 86–88 (2010), https://www.amnestyusa.org/files/pdfs/deadlydelivery.pdf
(discussing the lack of consistent reporting on maternal mortality and other childbirth
outcomes in the United States); SAKALA & CORRY, supra note 60, at 68–70 (calling
for a standardized system of measuring maternity care performance and reporting
mechanisms to identify “current patterns of overuse, underuse, and unjustified
practice variation”); see also Elizabeth Kukura, Giving Birth Under the ACA:
Analyzing the Use of Law as a Tool to Improve Health Care, 94 NEB. L. REV. 799,
850 & n.299 (2016) (discussing introduction of new diagnostic codes across various
medical specialties).
228. See Peter B. Angood et al., Blueprint for Action: Steps Toward a High-Quality, HighValue Maternity Care System, 20 WOMEN’S HEALTH ISSUES S18, S26 (2010)
(identifying the need for separate billing codes for cesareans and vaginal deliveries
under different conditions).
229. EUGENE R. DECLERCQ ET AL., LISTENING TO MOTHERS: REPORT OF THE FIRST
NATIONAL U.S. SURVEY OF WOMEN’S CHILDBEARING EXPERIENCES (2002),
http://www.nationalpartnership.org/research-library/maternal-health/listening-tomothers-i_2002.pdf.
230. Listening to Mothers Reports and Surveys, NAT’L PARTNERSHIP FOR WOMEN &
FAMILIES, http://www.nationalpartnership.org/issues/health/maternity/listening-tomothers.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2017) (discussing the “three initial surveys and two
follow-up surveys directed to initial participants”). In 2014, Childbirth Connection
became a program of the National Partnership for Women & Families. History,
CHILDBIRTH CONNECTION, http://www.childbirthconnection.org/about/history/ (last
visited Dec. 30, 2017).
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medical decision-making and their experience of coercion by their
health care providers.231 But this is just one study and as such, leaves
much ground uncovered. The outpouring of testimonials collected by
birth-oriented consumer advocacy groups suggests there are aspects
of maternity care that remain woefully underexplored, including the
use of coercive tactics to secure consent to treatment.232 In particular,
research is needed on the specific experiences of poor women,
women of color, young women, immigrant women, women with
mental illness, and other women who may be especially vulnerable to
coercion by health care providers. The collection of more empirical
and narrative data about women’s birth experiences will bolster the
work of advocates seeking to create cultural change within maternity
care settings.
C. Administrative Complaints
A third approach to tackling inappropriate child welfare threats and
other coercive means of securing a pregnant woman’s consent to
medical treatment focuses on the use of administrative mechanisms
to lodge complaints about the improper conduct of health care
providers. Depending on the circumstances, patients may have
several different opportunities to make a formal complaint. First,
each hospital has a review board that conducts oversight of staff and
affiliates who work within the hospital, and receives complaints from
patients treated at that hospital.233 Although some women have
reported dismissive and disheartening responses from hospital
administrators with whom they have shared their stories of
mistreatment by maternity care providers, it is critically important
that hospitals continue to hear about the quality of care provided
within its walls.234 Advocates should work with hospitals and
medical practices to improve the way patient complaints are
investigated and addressed, with more transparency and

231. See supra notes 149, 151, 230 and accompanying text.
232. See, e.g., Dray Amicus Brief, supra note 84, at 7–8 (collecting testimonials for
submission to Dray court); Letter from Dawn Thompson et al., President,
Improving Birth, to Dr. Hal Lawrence, III et al., Exec. Vice President & CEO, Am.
Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists 1 (Sept. 4, 2015), https://improvingbirth.org/w
p-content/uploads/2015/09/9.04.15-Ltr-to-ACOG.pdf (describing receipt of “an
alarming--and alarmingly frequent--stream of consumer feedback to Improving Birth
about instances of disrespect, misinformation, and abuse at the hands of maternity
care providers”).
233. See Diaz-Tello, supra note 24, at 225.
234. See Dray Amicus Brief, supra note 84, at 29–30.
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accountability for inappropriate provider behavior.235 In particular,
hospitals should be encouraged to understand how taking action to
reduce birth conflicts and improve provider-patient communication is
likely to result in fewer malpractice lawsuits.236
Women should also consider filing complaints with oversight
bodies outside the hospital. This might include a third-party
administered complaint system through accrediting bodies like the
Joint Commission, which is responsible for hospital oversight,237 or
the Commission for the Accreditation of Birth Centers, which
oversees freestanding birth centers.238 Affected patients should also
consider filing a formal complaint with the appropriate state licensing
agency alleging misconduct on the part of doctors and nurses who
improperly use coercive tactics to secure consent to medical
treatment. They can draw on the clinical and ethical guidelines of
ACOG and the AMA, especially the AMA Code of Ethics, to
encourage a more faithful adherence of medical practitioners to such
professional standards.239 Even if such complaints fail to result in
discipline or sanction by the oversight board, the process of receiving
and reviewing such complaints will help educate members of the
state licensing agency and create heightened awareness of coercion as
a matter of integrity for the medical system. Consumer advocacy
groups have a role to play in helping educate women about their
options for filing administrative complaints and providing resources
to assist them in doing so.240 To that end, education, data collection,
and enhanced use of administrative mechanisms are interconnected
strategies; more formal complaints will help educate stakeholders
with power to influence clinical practice, such as hospital
administrators, state regulators, and even physicians themselves.
235. See Diaz-Tello, supra note 24, at 225 (calling on consumer groups to advocate with
health care facilities to develop accountability mechanisms for threatening and other
inappropriate conduct by health care providers).
236. See Kukura, supra note 17 (manuscript at 41) (discussing research that links poor
provider-patient communication and lack of trust with the decision to bring a
malpractice claim).
237. See About the Joint Commission, JOINT COMMISSION, https://www.jointcommission.or
g/about_us/about_the_joint_commission_main.aspx (last visited Dec. 30, 2017).
238. About the CABC, COMMISSION FOR ACCREDITATION BIRTH CENTERS, https://www.birt
hcenteraccreditation.org/about-commission-accreditation-birth-centers/ (last visited
Dec. 30, 2017).
239. See supra notes 210–20 and accompanying text.
240. See, e.g., Accountability Toolkit: A Guide to Filing a Formal Grievance After a
Difficult Childbirth, IMPROVING BIRTH, https://improvingbirth.org/resources/#account
ability-toolkit (last visited Dec. 30, 2017).
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And better data collection about the nature and frequency of coercion
in maternity care decision-making will help educate care providers
about the problem and prepare those providing oversight to respond
appropriately.
V. CONCLUSION
The legal and ethical requirements that bind physicians make clear
that patients must give informed consent to medical treatment and
that the use of state power to secure a pregnant woman’s consent to
treatment is virtually never acceptable. And yet, several recent cases,
along with informal reports made to consumer advocacy
organizations, suggest that coercion is present in some clinical
settings, with a resulting increase in the risk of physical and
emotional harm to women and babies, as well as increased financial
burden for their families. Women who are poor, young, and
members of religious, racial, and ethnic minorities may be
particularly susceptible to coercive pressure during childbirth.
Coercion in maternity care should raise concerns for all those
invested in the medical profession, including those practitioners
whose respect for patient autonomy is reflected in their clinical care,
as the association with unethical practices might nevertheless impact
relationships with their patients and have negative consequences for
public health more generally.
There are some hopeful indications that the medical system can
correct improper coercive conduct by health care providers, such as
reforms instituted to deliver more patient-centered care, many of
which were part of the Affordable Care Act.241 In addition, growing
concern about the United States’ high cesarean rate among medical
professionals themselves may be leading providers to adopt a more
hands-off approach to labor and delivery for low-risk women, one
which finds support in the medical research literature.242 These
241. See Michael L. Millenson & Juliana Macri, Will the Affordable Care Act Move
Patient-Centeredness to Center Stage?: Timely Analysis of Immediate Health Policy
Issues, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND. (Mar. 2012), https://www.rwjf.org/content/d
am/farm/reports/reports/2012/rwjf72412.
242. See News Release, Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, Nation’s Ob-Gyns
Take Aim at Preventing Cesareans (Feb. 19, 2014), http://www.acog.org/About_ACO
G/News_Room/News_Releases/2014/Nations_Ob-Gyns_Take_Aim_at_Preventing_
Cesareans (identifying guideline changes aimed at decreasing the number of
cesareans, including recognizing cervical dilation of six (instead of four) centimeters
as the start of active labor and extending the recommended time for the pushing
phase); see also AM. COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS & SOC’Y FOR
MATERNAL FETAL MED., supra note 163 (noting the concern arising from the “rapid
increase in cesarean birth rates”).
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reasons for cautious optimism should inform future research and
advocacy to eliminate the improper use of child welfare threats and
other coercive tactics employed to secure a woman’s consent to
treatment.
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